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[T]hat which one man has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be
driven out of the market by his rivals, who finding himself, without
any expense, in possession of a discovery which has cost the inventor
much time and expense, would be able to deprive him of all his
deserved advantages, by selling at a lower price.
Jeremy Bentham'
Maintaining monopolies for medicine for poor countries during a
worldwide health catastrophe is unethical and immoral.
2
Paul Davis, Health GAP Coalition
Associate Professor, University of Arkansas - Fayetteville. 2003-2004 Fellow, Carnegie
Council on Ethics and International Affairs. The author would like to thank Jade 0. Laye, J.D.
2004, University of Arkansas School of Law, for his help on the research of this article. This
article is dedicated to the memory of my brother, Chinedu Uzo Ewelukwa.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 71 (1839).
2. Press Release, Health GAP Coalition, Brazil Issue's [sic] World's First Compulsory
License Citing Health Crisis, Country Will Produce Generic Version of Nelfinavir (Aug. 22,
2001), available at http://www.healthgap.org/press-releases/01/082201HGAP-PRBRACL
Nelf.html. Health GAP is an organization of AIDS and human rights activists who campaign
against policies that deny HIV treatment to the millions around the world who need it. See Health
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INTRODUCTION

The AIDS epidemic turned the world's attention to the problem of
high drug prices in developing countries and the numerous barriers to
accessing essential drugs in these countries. The AIDS epidemic also
triggered an extensive debate on the relationship between patents,3
global trade agreements, particularly the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS Agreement"), 4 and public
health, in addition to raising important questions about the role of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO")5 in promoting access to medicine
in developing countries. Before November 2001, the core questions
were: whether the TRIPS Agreement retarded access to essential
medicine in developing countries by raising the cost of patented
pharmaceuticals, 6 whether compulsory licensing in developing countries
GAP, About Health GAP, at http://www.healthgap.org/hgap/about.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2005).
3. A patent can be simply defined as:
an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that
provides a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a
A patent provides protection for the invention to the owner of the
problem ....
patent. The protection is granted for a limited period, generally 20 years.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), About Intellectual Property, Inventions
(Patents) (emphasis omitted), at http:llwww.wipo.intlabout-iplen/patents.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2005).
4. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs -e/legal-e/
27-trips.pdf. The TRIPS Agreement is arguably one of the most controversial of the Uruguay
Round Agreements and has been the subject of numerous articles and commentaries. See
generally Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Access to Pharmaceuticals,and Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 859 (2002); ROBERT L. OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL

(2003); Haochen
Sun, A Wider Access to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

(2003).
5. The WTO is an organization established in 1994 to "provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations" among Member States. WTO Agreement, supra
note 4, art. 11(2). One of the WTO's basic functions is to "facilitate the implementation,
administration and operation, and further the objectives" of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
Id. art. 111.
6. For articles discussing the early debates surrounding the TRIPS Agreement, see Frederick
M. Abbott, The TRIPS - Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis,
7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71 (2001); Patrick Marc, Note, Compulsory Licensing and the South
African Medicine Act of 1997: Violation or Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement?, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 109 (2001); Naomi
A. Bass, Note, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 191
(2002); Mattew Krammer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: Preserving the Integrity of
American Patents Overseas After the South African Medicines Act, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 553
(2000).
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was needed to address the problem of access in these countries, and
whether the TRIPS Agreement permitted countries to resort to compulsory licensing to address public health problems.'

At the 2001 Ministerial Conference 8 in Doha, Qatar, WTO Members adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health ("Doha Declaration").9 The Doha Declaration was groundbreaking in the sense that it appeared to unequivocally recognize the primacy
of public health over commercial interests. 10 The Declaration answered
in the affirmative the question of whether WTO Member States can
resort to compulsory licensing to address a public health crisis. However, the Declaration left one thorny question unresolved: whether WTO
Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector, who are thus unable to make use of compulsory
licensing, can import generic drugs manufactured under compulsory

licenses from other countries (the "Paragraph 6" question).
Between November 2001 and September 2003, fresh debates
ensued over the Paragraph 6 question. To allay the fears of developing
countries, two decisions were made by the TRIPS Council and the General Council in 2002. On June 27, 2002, the TRIPS Council, acting
under paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, made a decision to grant the
least-developed country members of the WTO an extension on the time
in which they had to comply with some of the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement." On July 8, 2002, the General Council adopted a decision
7. When a government grants a compulsory license, the patent holder retains intellectual
property rights and is generally entitled to an adequate remuneration. In the pharmaceutical
sector, a generic drug is a bioequivalent of a patented drug and is usually intended to be used
interchangeably with the original patented drug. A generic drug is not produced under a patent.
Under most domestic patent laws, governments can issue compulsory licenses to allow a
competitor to produce a patented product or process under license and subject to conditions aimed
at safeguarding the legitimate interests of the patent owner.
8. The Ministerial Conference is the highest forum in the structure of the WTO. The
Ministerial Conference is composed of representatives of all the WTO Members and meets at least
once every two years. Since the establishment of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference has been
held five times: Singapore (December 1996), Geneva (May 1998), Seattle (November - December
1999), Doha (November 2001), and Cancun (September 2003).
9. WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto -e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl.tripse.htm.
10. Sun, supra note 4, at 104 (noting that "[t]he Doha Declaration marked a turning point for
political and legal relations at the WTO").
11. Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for LeastDeveloped Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products,
IP/C/25 (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/art66-1 e.htm.
Paragraph I of the decision states: "Least-developed country Members will not be obliged,
with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the
TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016."
Id. Paragraph 2 provides that, "[tihis decision is made without prejudice to the right of least-
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waiving the obligation of least-developed countries ("LDCs") under
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical
products.12 Finally, on August 30, 2003, at a meeting of the WTO General Council,' 3 world trade ministers adopted the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health ("2003 Decision on Implementation"), 4
which appears to finally lay to rest the lingering questions regarding the
relationship between patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and access to

medicine.
The different battles over the relationship between patents and public health now appear to be over. This article takes a close look at the
developed country Members to seek other extensions of the period provided for in paragraph I of
Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement." Id.
On the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, all WTO Members except developing countries
and least-developed countries had one year after the entry into force of the Agreement to comply
with the provisions of the Agreement. Except for obligations relating to national treatment and
most-favored nation, which became applicable after the expiration of one year, developing
countries received an additional transition period of four years. Under paragraph 1 of Article 66 of
the TRIPS Agreement, least-developed countries received a ten-year extension on the date
stipulated for WTO Members to implement the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 4, art. 66. This meant that they were not expected to implement most provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement until 2005. With the June 27, 2002 Decision of the Council for TRIPS, the
least-developed countries do not have to implement the TRIPS Agreement until 2016.
12. Least-Developed Country Members - Obligations Under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WT/L/478 (July 8, 2002), availableat http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/art70_9_e.htm.
Paragraph I states: "The obligations of least-developed country Members under paragraph 9
of Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products
until 1 January 2016." Id. Paragraph 2 states: "This waiver shall be reviewed by the Ministerial
Conference not later than one year after it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver
terminates, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article IX of the WTO
Agreement." Id.
Article 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in accordance
with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding
the provisions of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining marketing
approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that
Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry into
force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent
granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in
such other Member.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 70(9).
13. The WTO General Council is composed of representatives of all the Member States. The
General Council meets as appropriate and conducts the functions of the Ministerial Conference in
the intervals between Ministerial Conference meetingi. See VTO Agreement, supra note 4, art.
IV.2.
14. WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declarationon the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Aug. 30, 2003, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003) [hereinafter 2003
Decision on Implementation], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/implempara6 e.htm.

2005] PATENT WARS IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

207

battlefield more than three years after the war began as an attempt to
assess gains and to map progress. In this article, I argue that although
the several battles over access may have ended, determining what
exactly has been achieved and forecasting the potential impact of the
Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation on access to
medicine in developing countries may not be easy. It may therefore be a
long time before the suffering masses in the Third World derive any
tangible benefit from the two texts. There are several reasons for this.
First, both the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation have major loopholes that could still be used to curtail the rights of
developing countries in the future. Second, for countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, the 2003 Decision of Implementation contains conditions that are somewhat burdensome and that could
discourage the emergence of a robust, generic pharmaceuticals industry.
Third, it is doubtful that developing countries will begin to grant compulsory licenses as envisaged in the two texts. To begin with, developed
countries could still use covert threats of economic sanctions and other
forms of political pressure to compel developing countries to respect the
intellectual property rights ("IPRs") of patent holders. In addition, quite
apart from the political pressures developed countries may assert, the
plain reality is that "[flew compulsory licences have ever been granted
in developing countries." 5
The most important but hitherto overlooked problems, however, are
the problems of the abuse of patent rights and anti-competitive practices
by pharmaceutical companies and the absence of comprehensive rules at
the global level to address these problems. In the United States, brandname pharmaceutical companies, in their attempt to maintain their dominant market share, are increasingly resorting to a host of abusive and
anti-competitive practices. Despite the existence of strong antitrust laws
in the United States and a multitude of laws and regulations directed at
protecting U.S. consumers from false business practices, pharmaceutical
companies find ingenious ways to evade the law and to prey on vulnerable consumers. A study of unfolding lawsuits in the United States demonstrates that in the absence of strong antitrust rules at the domestic
level and multilateral agreements on competition law at the global level,
pharmaceutical companies will find ways to avoid the consequences of
the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation. In
other words, absent the development of a strong ethical code of conduct
to guide practices in the pharmaceutical industry, the nature of competition in the pharmaceutical industry and the capacity of states and/or the
15.

JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

COUNTRIES

382 (2001).

RIGHTS

IN THE

WTO

AND DEVELOPING
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WTO to regulate competition in the industry may ultimately determine
the overall effect that the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on
Implementation will have on access to medicine in poor countries.
In pursuing my argument, I examine and attempt to draw lessons
from the present war against abuse of patent rights and anti-competitive
practices in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. The U.S. experience suggests that in the absence of strong public and private oversight, a host of
abuses are possible in the pharmaceutical industry. One such abuse is in
the form of collusive settlement agreements between brand-name drug
manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers that have the effect of
delaying the entry of generic drugs into the market. These cases suggest
the need, beyond well-intended legal solutions, for public oversight and
vigilance by consumer groups and non-governmental organizations.
Undoubtedly, there are strong and compelling reasons why IPRs
must be respected and accorded maximum protection; however, there
are other values worth protecting besides IPRs. IPRs operate as an
incentive for the development of new and useful technology, including
pharmaceuticals.' 6 IPRs, particularly patents, are important to the pharmaceutical industry for two reasons. First, the industry frequently has to
invest a considerable amount of time and resources into researching and
developing new drugs.' 7 Second, "pharmaceuticals are generally relatively easy to reverse-engineer and thus are open to easy copying in the
absence of. . . protection." 8 For developing countries, the protection of
IPRs can also encourage the transfer of technology from developed
countries.1 9 Because IPRs are commercial rights essentially driven
towards economic gains,2" they can and frequently do affect the welfare
of the general public. This means that when IPRs are discussed, the
emphasis must not be exclusively on the rights of producers of intellectual property ("IP"), particularly patent holders, but rather, the perspective of consumers and the general welfare of nations must also be taken
into account. 2
16. Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and
the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 372 (2000) ("There exists an important relationship between a strong
patent regime and Research and Development (R&D).").
17. Id. at 373 (observing that research into new drugs is risky, expensive and time
consuming).
18. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner,
United Nations Comm'n on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, para. 37, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) [hereinafter U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights].
19. Singham, supra note 16, at 364 (arguing that "a strong patent protection regime has a net
global social gain, as well as a net social gain to developing countries").
20. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 18, para. 38.
21. OSTERGARD, supra note 4, at 12.
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Overall, I conclude that the battle over access to medicine was not a
waste. It was necessary that the WTO clarify the flexibilities countries
enjoy under the TRIPS Agreement to address their domestic problems.
Even if developing countries do not fully exercise their right to grant
compulsory licenses in the future, the existence of such a right can function as a powerful weapon in bargaining for lower prices from brandname pharmaceutical companies.2 2 Issuing a compulsory license can be
a solution to the problem of patent exclusivity; for example, it is frequently used to remedy certain antitrust violations involving IPRs.
However, compulsory licenses can also trigger or encourage a range of
abusive practices in the pharmaceutical industry as affected companies
struggle to maintain their market share and dominant position.
The debate over access to medicine underscored the fact that there
are obvious political, social, economic, and policy implications when
states decide to adopt strong intellectual property protection.2 3 The
debate further highlighted the fact that "[aill states are not equal in their
level of political and economic development," 2 4 something that was
ignored during the negotiations that produced the TRIPS Agreement.2 5
The TRIPS Agreement was the product of aggressive negotiation by
developed countries' governments, requiring all signatory states to
implement a full "Western-style" IP regime.2 6 Unwittingly, largely as a
result of intense pressure from developed countries, developing countries signed on to the TRIPS Agreement without addressing the potential
social and economic costs of their action.2 7
In the final analysis, the pharmaceutical industry cannot be the
enemy for three reasons. First, the battle over access to medicine arose
primarily because medicines are essential goods, yet their production
does require substantial and very expensive technological input. The
22. As a result of a threat by the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory license, Roche,
the Swiss pharmaceutical company, agreed to substantially lower its price for Nelfinavir, a
patented AIDS drug. See DUNCAN MATrHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 115 (2002).
23. OSTERGARD, supra note 4, at 2 (observing that "states do not adopt strong IPR policies as

a matter of rational economic policy only, but also as a matter of rational political policy").
24. Id. at 3.
25. See id. at 7 (observing that the US argued there were international benefits in global IPR
protection, regardless of where the countries were in their own development stages).
26. Id. at I (observing that the TRIPS Agreement was a result, in part, of a strong U.S.
lobbying effort). Developed countries were the strongest proponents of the TRIPS Agreement
because of changes in their industrial base and intense global competition. Id. at 7. Essentially, as
the comparative advantage of Western nations shifted from agriculture and manufacturing to
sectors requiring high technological input, these countries became anxious to see intellectual
property rights globalized. Id.
27. See OSTERGARD, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that the United States pressured "governments
of developing countries into accepting stringent IPR regulations").
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nature of drugs inevitably means that pharmaceutical companies have a
unique type of financial and social responsibility: they provide important
public goods.2 8 Second, although WTO Members now appear to have
the freedom to issue compulsory licenses to address their health
problems, the cooperation of patent holders will still be crucial for countries to obtain the technology needed to effectively work the patent.
Third, given my predictions that it is unlikely that many developing
countries will actually issue compulsory licenses in the future, countries
may still have to rely on the goodwill of pharmaceutical companies to
meet their pharmaceutical needs through alternative channels.
This article is divided into seven sections. Part II offers a background to the Multilateral Trading System ("MTS"), the TRIPS Agreement, and the compulsory licensing debate as it has unfolded since the
explosion of the AIDS epidemic. Part III introduces the reader to the
2003 Decision on Implementation and highlights the main provisions of
the Decision. In Part IV, I engage in a critical analysis of the 2003
Decision on Implementation. Part V focuses on pharmaceutical abuses
in the United States and the current efforts by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the private sector to fight these abuses. In Part VI,
I examine current efforts to establish a multilateral framework on competition law and policy and the obstacles to these efforts. Paradoxically,
although many developing countries do not have any competition law
and are likely to benefit from such a framework, developing countries
have strongly opposed the idea of a multilateral rule on competition policy. In Part VII, I conclude by noting that although welcomed, and
despite the flexibilities afforded by the Doha Declaration and the Decision, few compulsory licenses will be issued.
I advance several reasons for my position. First, very few countries
have internal procedures for granting compulsory licenses, and it may be
difficult for the countries that do have the procedures in place to exploit
these licenses due to lack of capacity. 9 Second, developing countries
that are starved of foreign capital and that desire to attract direct foreign
investment would most likely refrain from liberally utilizing the flexibilities. 3 ° Third, developing countries that desire to encourage inventive activity domestically may decide that compulsory licenses are
28. ANNA THOMAS, VSO GLOBAL EDUC. & ADVOCACY DEP'T, STREET PRICE: A

GLOBAL

APPROACH TO DRUG PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (Ken Bluestone et al. eds.) (Position

Paper for Voluntary Service Overseas, or "VSO"), availableat http://vso.org.uk/Images/positionpapers street-price tcm8-1605.pdf; see Singham, supra note 16, at 365.
29. MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114.
30. See id. (noting that "foreign companies may be reluctant to invest in developing countries
with a propensity to grant compulsory licenses"). In effect, the granting of compulsory licenses
has its drawbacks and should not be seen as the preferred option for countries.
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counterproductive as they "could work against the interests of new
domestic inventors, and have adverse demonstration effects on other
potential inventors. '31 Finally, in situations where the cooperation of
the IPR holder is needed in order to acquire the technology which would
with the protected invention, such
enable a developing country to work 32
cooperation may not be forthcoming.
The intersection of patent rights, global trade, public health, and
ethics has unearthed many thorny issues. For example, is a balance
between intellectual property rights, state sovereignty, and ethics possible? Should ethical concerns and human rights norms trump property
(patent) rights? Do the sovereign rights of states allow them the option
of "opting out" of onerous and "mischievous" international obligations?
Finally, does the TRIPS Agreement prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health?

I.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
BACKGROUND TO THE TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY

("TRIPS")

AGREEMENT AND THE COMPULSORY

LICENSING DEBATE

The last three hundred years has witnessed tremendous evolution in
our notion of property. From its once humble beginnings focused on
tangibles, the notion of property has broadened to include intangible
products of the human mind such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
For the most part, this development in the notion of property occurred
primarily in Europe and North America.3 3 As long as information could
be contained within national borders, domestic law was considered sufficient in regulating dealings in intellectual property. However, intangible
property is more fluid than tangible property and crosses national boundaries much more readily. Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth
century, counterfeiting and piracy in the global marketplace had become
a strong concern of many countries creating a growing realization in the
industrialized world that multilateral efforts were needed to address
these concerns. This triggered a century-long effort directed at
expanding and universalizing intellectual property laws (what I refer to
as "the globalization project"), culminating in the adoption of the TRIPS
31. WATAL, supra note 15, at 382.

32. Id.
33. For literature on the history and development of intellectual property in the West, see
generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967);

Maximilian Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 143 (1945); Giulio Mandich,
Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 166 (1948); Frank D. Prager, A History of
Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'y 711 (1944).
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Agreement in 1994. 34
A.

The TRIPS Agreement

Initial efforts to globalize and harmonize intellectual property law
produced two significant international treaties: the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention") 35 and
the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works ("Berne Convention").36 However, it was the entry into force on

January 1, 1995 of the TRIPS Agreement that marked a major turning
point in the globalization project.3 7 Negotiated as part of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,3 8 the TRIPS Agreement
comes as a package deal, meaning that all WTO Members are automatically bound by the agreement.3 9
In terms of coverage, the TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive multilateral instrument on intellectual property rights.4 0 The
TRIPS Agreement is innovative in at least five ways. First, the TRIPS
34. For an interesting history of the globalization of intellectual property rights and the role of
international institutions and global corporate actors in this effort, see generally MATrHEWS, supra
note 22.
35. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.
wipo.intltreaties/en/ip/paris/index.html.
36. See Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.
wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/index.html.
37. For literature on the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement, see generally Frank
Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating Strategies of the Western
Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317 (1990); Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property
as a Trade Issue: The Making of the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 18:1 WORLD COMPETITION, LAW & ECON. REV. 137 (1994); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1998).
38. The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. The agreement is annexed to the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Punta del Este, Uruguay (Sept. 20, 1986), reprinted in RAJ
BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HANDBOOK

261 (2d ed. 2001).

39. With the exception of four "plurilateral" agreements, all the WTO agreements apply to all
WTO members. With one signature, WTO members each accepted all the Uruguay Round
agreements as one single package. See WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements ("The WTO
framework ensures a 'single undertaking approach' to the results of the Uruguay Round - thus,
membership in the WTO entails accepting all the results of the Round without exception."),
available at http:llwww.wto.org/englishdocs-elegal-e/ursum-e.htm#Agreement (last visited Jan.
28, 2005).
40. See Trips Agreement, supra note 4. Part II of the TRIPS Agreement deals with all types
of intellectual property rights. The agreement covers: Copyright and Related Rights (Section 1);
Trademarks (Section 2); Geographical Indications (Section 3); Industrial Designs (Section 4);
Patents (Section 5); Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits (Section 6); Protection
of Undisclosed Information (Section 7); and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual
Licences (Section 8). Id. arts. 9-40.
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Agreement represents the first time in the history of multilateral trade
negotiations that intellectual property has been integrated into an international trade agreement. Second, compared to preexisting instruments,
the TRIPS Agreement contains a complete provision on enforcement
and imposes detailed obligations on states.4 1 Third, the TRIPS agreement establishes a strong monitoring and supervisory scheme through
the machinery of the TRIPS Council, a marked departure from the norm
in previous conventions.4" Fourth, the TRIPS Agreement addresses
compliance and enforcement questions through its automatic linkage
with the WTO dispute settlement system; this linkage ensures a permanent, quasi-judicial dispute resolution mechanism to address intellectual
property controversies.4 3 Finally, WTO Members cannot enter a reservation in respect of any of the provisions of the Agreement without the
consent of the other Members.4 4 Overall, the TRIPS Agreement offers
an institutionalized, multilateral, and comprehensive mechanism for
addressing intellectual property-related issues and disputes.
The success of the globalization project is reflected in the minimum
substantive and procedural standards of protection for intellectual property protection that the TRIPS Agreement establishes. With respect to
patents, the agreement lays down standards relating to patentability,
scope of patent protection, limitations on patent rights, and enforcement.
Article 27 stipulates that "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application,"4 6 and that "patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discriminationas to the place of invention, the field of
4 7
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced."
41. Id. arts. 41-49.
42. Id. art. 68 ("The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in
particular, Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights.").
43. The dispute settlement mechanism was established pursuant to a separate agreement. See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/28-dsue.htm.
44. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 72.
45. Bibek Debroy, The Compulsory Licensing Anomaly, in TRIPS AND HEALTHCARE:
RETHINKING THE DEBATE 13 (Int'l Pol'y Network July 2001), available at http://www.
policynetwork.net/uploaded/pdf/rethinking-the debate_0701 pdf. (noting that the WTO is "a
better forum for establishing global norms in IP, not only because more countries are members of
the WTO, but also because the WTO system ensures enforcement and compliance through.the
dispute resolution and retaliation provisions").
46. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 1 (emphasis added).

47. Id. (emphasis added).
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GlobalizationAmidst Growing Discontent

The TRIPS Agreement exposes the North-South asymmetries in
global trading arrangements.4 8 To developed-country governments, the
TRIPS Agreement was conceived primarily as an instrument to combat
global counterfeiting and piracy, eliminate distortions in and barriers to
global trade, allow the industry to recoup research and development
("R&D") costs, and guarantee a fair return on investment in innovative
research.49 These goals, they argued, must be met within the context of
a limited monopoly granted by patents. During the negotiation for the
TRIPS Agreement, multinational corporations and developed-country
governments also argued that an enhanced global IP regime would facilitate long-term economic development in developing countries by fostering technology and investment flow to the developing countries. 5"
To some non-governmental organizations and some developingcountry governments, however, the TRIPS Agreement is but one component of a broader policy of "'technological protectionism' aimed at
consolidating an international division of labour whereunder Northern
countries generate innovations and Southern countries constitute the
market for the resulting products and services."" The real motivation
for TRIPS, some have argued, was to "freeze the comparative advantages" 52 that had ensured Northern technological supremacy and counter
Northern countries' declining competitive position in the global
market.53
Viewed from the perspective of developing countries, critics also
argue that the trend is not really towards a globalization of IPRs (suggesting a convergence of norms and a harmonization of standards), but
48. Numerous articles have been written on the subject of North-South asymmetries in
international trade. Several authors have also explored the implications of the TRIPS Agreement
for developing countries. See generally CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000);
Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Esperanza Durin & Constantine
Michalopoulos, Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries in the WTO Millenium
Round, 2 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 853 (1999).
49. See CORREA, supra note 48, at 3-4.
50. See MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 5 ("Given the likely impact of the TRIPS Agreement on
developing countries and the possible implications for future renegotiation of the Agreement,
global corporate actors have stressed the role of intellectual property protection in facilitating
economic development through technology transfer and inward investment.").
51. CORREA, supra note 48, at 5 (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement aims at stifling imitative
paths to industrialization).
52. Id. at 4.
53. See id. at 5 (noting the TRIPS Agreement was "an expression of an aggressive action by
the US industries to establish international rules that counter their declining competitive position
in world markets").
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really a universalization of standards of protection that is Northerngrown 4 and suitable for industrialized countries.
In other words,
given developing countries' dependence upon innovations made in the
North 6 and their negligible share of the world market in medium- and
high-tech goods,5 7 it is believed that industrialized countries have the
most to benefit from the TRIPS Agreement.
Finally, there is also the perception in the developing world that the
TRIPS Agreement could be used to prevent poor countries from achieving important social and developmental goals. The fear is that by ignoring the profound differences in economic and technological capabilities
between the North and the South and by offering a one-size-fits-all
approach to intellectual property protection, the TRIPS Agreement will
be progressively used to curtail policy options in developing countries
and hamper states in their efforts to address serious health emergencies.
C.

The PharmaceuticalIndustry, the AIDS Epidemic, and the
Compulsory License Debate

The pharmaceutical industry is at the center of the debate about the
relationship between patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and public
54. Id. at 3 (noting that in negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, industrialized countries had the
objective of universalizing the standards of intellectual property protection that they had
incorporated into their legislation). Correa notes further that the emerging framework of
intellectual property protection in the TRIPS Agreement "basically universalizes standards of
protection that are suitable for industrialized countries." Id. at 5; see also U.N. Comm'n on
Human Rights, supra note 18, para. 25.
[T]he protection contained in the TRIPS Agreement focuses on forms of protection
that have developed in industrialized countries. For example, in the case of patents,
the protection in the Agreement is most relevant to the protection of modem forms
of technology, such as biotechnology, and most relevant to innovators situated in a
selected number of industrialized countries.
Id.
55. Some scholars question whether developing countries are really ready to have strong
intellectual property rights. They point to the fact that industrialized countries were also able to
establish higher standards for intellectual property protection after they had attained a certain level
of technological and industrial capacity. See CORREA, supra note 48, at 5.
56. See id. (citing studies by Nagesh Kumar that estimate that of the patents granted in the
United States between 1977 and 1996, developing countries accounted for less than 2%, while
95% of 1,650,800 patents granted were conferred on applicants from ten industrialized countries).
See

NAGESH KUMAR, TECHNOLOGY GENERATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS IN THE WORLD

ECONOMY: RECENT TRENDS AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

5-9 (The United

Nations Univ. Inst. for New Technologies, Discussion Paper Series No. 9702, 1997), available at
http://www.intech.unu.edu/publications/discussion-papers/9702.pdf.

57.

CORREA,

supra note 48, at 5-6 (citing estimates by Alcorta and Peres to the effect that of

the exports of the Group of 7 (G7) to OECD countries, 56.7% consist of medium- and high-tech
goods). See LuDovico ALCORTA & WILSON PERES, INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGICAL
SPECIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBEAN 8-10 (The United Nations Univ. for New

Technologies, Discussion Paper Series No. 9509, 1995), available at http://www.intech.unu.edu/
publications/discussion-papers/9509.pdf.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:203

health. "Until recently, the patent laws of most poor countries exempted
pharmaceutical products from protection." 8 As a result of the TRIPS
Agreement, however, many countries amended or are in the process of
amending their patent laws to comply with TRIPS. In the wake of the
huge AIDS epidemics decimating millions of lives in the developing
world, questions have surfaced regarding how to balance the patent
rights of pharmaceutical corporations against the sovereign rights of
states to determine their internal health policies and to ensure that essential drugs are available and accessible to their citizens. Further, the
question of how to balance the patent rights of pharmaceutical corporations against core, internationally-guaranteed rights such as "the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health,"5 9 has also assumed a central place in this debate.6"
Essentially, developing countries' governments, civil society groups,
and AIDS sufferers feared that the TRIPS Agreement could be used to
disrupt the availability of cheap generic pharmaceutical products, and
that developing countries would be forced to obtain brand-name pharmaceutical products from multinational companies at exorbitant prices.
1.

THE AIDS EPIDEMIC

As of December 2001, the total number of people (adult and children) living with HIV/AIDS ("PLHA") was estimated at forty million,6 1
and the total number of living children orphaned by AIDS was estimated
at fourteen million.6 2 Of the total number of PLHA, most live in the
developing world.6 3 Five million people became newly infected with
58. Julian Morris, Introduction and Summary, in TRIPS AND HEALTHCARE: RETHINKING THE
DEBATE 2, (Int'l Pol'y Network July 2001), available at http://www.policynetwork.net/uploaded/
pdf/rethinking the debate 0701.pdf; see also MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114 (observing that
"[flor many developing countries, the underlying rationale for excluding pharmaceutical products
from patent protection in the pre-TRIPS era was to enhance access to medicines and healthcare").
59. International Covenant on Economic, Social lind Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
60. For a human rights analysis of the TRIPS Agreement, see U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, supra note 18, para. 2 (noting that "the TRIPS Agreement could affect the enjoyment of
several rights - in particular the right to food, the right to development, the human rights of
indigenous peoples").
61. See JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/

AIDS EPIDEMIC 8 (2002) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC], availableat
http://www.unaids.org/EN/resources/publications/corporatelublications/report+onMhe+globalivaidstidemic+2002+.asp; see also JOHANNES vAN DAM & SHERRY A. HUTCHINSON, THE
POPULATION COUNCIL, ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS: REPORT OF A MEETING OF
INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS, 12-13 JUNE 2001, WASHINGTON, DC, USA 1 (2002) [hereinafter
ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS], available at http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/horizons/
accesstotreatment.pdf.
62. REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note 61, at 8.
63. ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS, supra note 61, at I.
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HIV in 2001, and three million AIDS deaths were recorded in that same
year.

64

The discovery of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy
("HAART") as a treatment for AIDS led to a paradigm shift in most of
the industrialized world because HAART brought about significant
reduction in the prevalence of AIDS-related morbidity and mortality in
the West. In the West, it became possible to view AIDS not as a death
sentence but as a manageable chronic disease. 65 However, in most of
the developing world, the story was different. As a result of the absence
of HAART in developing countries, instead of treatment, the focus of
national programs and international support was on prevention, the treatment of opportunistic infections, and care and support of affected persons. 6 6 The principle barrier to treatment frequently cited by national
governments and donor agencies was the cost of HAART (estimated at
U.S. $100-$300 per person per month). 67 Thus, as of 2001, despite
breakthroughs in medicine, only 230,000 of the six million people who
were sick enough to require HAART were receiving it. Of these, half
lived in Brazil. 68 This meant that at least ninety-six percent of people in
developing countries who needed treatment were not receiving it.
2.

DOES TRIPS PROVIDE AN ANSWER?

Against the backdrop of a massive HIV/AIDS epidemic and the
reported welfare effects of pharmaceutical product patents in developing
countries,6 9 some governments in the developing world began to explore
64. REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note 61, at 8.
65. See ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS, supra note 61, at 3 ("[I]n the United States,
the number of PLHA increased from 174,244 in 1993 to 317,368 in 1999, while mortality
associated with AIDS decreased from 45,494 to 16,767 in that same period.").
66. See id. at 1.

67. Id. at 3. Other reasons cited included the capacity of health care delivery systems and the
ability of patients to adhere to lifelong treatment regimens. Id. at 1.
68. In Brazil, the government instituted a universal access to AIDS treatment program. This
led to a fifty-four percent reduction in AIDS-related mortality between 1995 and 1999. The
treatment resulted in overall cost-savings for the government, in terms of avoided hospitalization
and reduction in the burden of opportunistic infections, totaling U.S. $677 million between 1997
and 1999. Some observers attribute the success in Brazil to the government's aggressive
involvement in the manufacture of generic versions of several HIV drugs in its own government
laboratories. See INT'L COUNCIL OF AIDS SERV. ORGS. (ICASO), THE INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: How ARE THEY BEING USED AND APPLIED? 11
(2002), available at http://www.icaso.org/docs/JFAP%20-%2OWeb.pdf.
69. Poor developing nations appear to be the most affected by global patent protection laws.
In many countries, welfare losses that economists attribute to heightened patent protection are
beginning to appear. Julio Noguds, a World Bank economist, estimates that welfare loss to
developing countries of patent pharmaceutical products would amount to a minimum of U.S. $3.5
billion and a maximum of U.S. $10.8 billion, while the income gains by foreign patent owners
would be between U.S. $2.1 billion and U.S. $14.4 billion. See Julio J. Noguds, Social Costs and
Benefits of Introducing Patent Protection for PharmaceuticalDrugs in Developing Countries,
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the possibility of using compulsory licenses to lower drug prices. These
countries acted on the assumption that the TRIPS Agreement allowed
governments to address critical shortages in essential drugs through
compulsory licenses. However, countries that attempted to address the
domestic health crisis through compulsory licensing came under heavy
attack from the pharmaceutical industry7" and from some governments
in the developed world, particularly the U.S. government. 7 '
The problem was that even though the TRIPS Agreement addresses
conditions for the granting of compulsory licenses and does appear to
allow governments some flexibility to enable them to address domestic
crises, the entire agreement is riddled with ambiguities and permits multiple interpretations. Upon examination, the TRIPS Agreement affords
governments several flexibilities. First, governments can exclude certain inventions from patentability.7 2 Second, pursuant to Article 30,
governments can place some exceptions on the rights of a patent holder
provided that such exceptions do not "unreasonably conflict with the
31:1 THE DEVELOPING EcONOMIEs 24 (1993), availableat http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/
De/pdf/93_0102.pdf. Several studies in developing countries support Noguds' conclusions.
These studies point to the appearance of about a six-fold increase of drug prices with the
introduction of product patents compared to non-patented products; a strong correlation between
the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents and significant (as much as forty-five percent)
reduction in the consumption of medicine; and wide disparities in prices of drugs between
countries where patent protection exists and countries with no protection. See generally Arvind
Subramanian, Putting some numbers on the TRIPS PharmaceuticalDebate, 10(2) INT'L J. TECH.
MGMT. 252-62 (1995); Chalhi Pablo, The Consequences of PharmaceuticalProduct Patenting,
15(2) WORLD COMPETITION (1991); National Working Group on Patent Laws, PATENT REGIME IN
TRIPS: CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1993).
70. In 2001, a group of multinational drug companies took the South African government to
court for attempting to import generic versions of AIDS drugs from India. The multinational
companies were forced to withdraw their suit after adverse media attention. See Drug Companies
Drop Lawsuit Against South Africa, U.S.A. TODAY, June 19, 2001, available at http:/lwww.
usatoday.com/news/world/2001-04-19-drugsuit.htm.
71. Past attempts by South Africa, Thailand, and Brazil to issue compulsory licenses for the
manufacture of critical HIV/AIDS drugs resulted in threats of economic sanctions and of the
invocation of the WTO dispute settlement procedure by the U.S. Government. See generally
OSTERGARD, supra note 4 (discussing attempts by the United States to get the South African
government to adjust its patent laws to enhance protection for pharmaceutical patents in Chapter
Six, "Life, Death and Intellectual Property: The South Africa-US Patent Dispute").
72. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(2) which states:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health
or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
Id. See also id. art. 27(3) (permitting WTO Members to exclude from patentability: "diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals" and "plants and animals
other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes").

2005]

PATENT WARS IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

219

normal exploitation of the patent."7 3 Third, WTO Members are allowed
to control anti-competitive practices and prevent abuse of rights by patent holders.74 Fourth, parallel importing is very possible under the
TRIPS Agreement.7 5 Most importantly, the preamble,7 6 Article 7
("Objectives") 77 and Article 8 ("Principles") 8 of the TRIPS Agreement
provide a broad framework for interpretation that, if followed, would
have allowed for a balanced result in the debate.
Although Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement appeared to accord
WTO Members broad rights to grant compulsory licenses, 79 a debate
73. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 30 ("Members may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.").
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8(2) ("Appropriate measures, provided that they are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.").
75. Parallel importing permits countries to search for the lowest price for patented products
worldwide and import from the lowest-priced source. It is based on the principal that once a
patent holder sells goods, he has lost his right to control the resale of those goods; in other words,
he is said to have "exhausted" his property rights in the product. The TRIPS Agreement is vague
on the subject and arguably left the issue of parallel importing unaddressed. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6 ("For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement,
subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the
issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.").
76. In the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, Members recognize "the underlying public
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl. Members
also recognize "the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base." Id.
77. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 7, articulating the objectives as:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.
Id.
78. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8(1) ("Members may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.").
79. Article 31 outlines the conditions a government must meet when issuing a compulsory
license. First, there must be a prior effort to negotiate a voluntary license with the patent holder
on "reasonable commercial terms" and within a reasonable period. TRIPS Agreement, supra note
4, art. 31(b). This requirement is waived in the case of a "national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use." Id. Second, "the
scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized." Id.
art. 31 (c). Third, the patent owner is to be paid "adequate remuneration ... taking into account
the economic value of the authorization." Id. art. 31(h).
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ensued regarding the precise scope of the flexibility permitted governments and the precise grounds for which compulsory licenses may be
issued.8" The pharmaceutical industry argued that the relationship
between TRIPS, patents, and access to medicine was tenuous at best.8"
According to the industry, the causes of lack of access to essential drugs
in developing countries were numerous and generally included official
corruption, misguided taxation, systemic poverty, exorbitant retail markups, and the general lack of infrastructure. 82 The argument was that patent protection is but "a very small part of a much bigger issue," 83 and
that compulsory licenses should be allowed only in very limited circumstances. Essentially, while welcoming the TRIPS Agreement, the industry called for a tightening of the provisions of the Agreement.8 4
Developing countries, on the other hand, view compulsory licensing as a critical pathway to ensuring low-cost drugs. They argued that
by facilitating generic entry and generic competition, it would be possible to ensure that essential drugs are accessible, available, and affordable. While avowing commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, developing
countries were of the view that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement
reduced the range of options available to governments to promote and
protect public health85 nor placed a restriction on the purposes for which
compulsory licenses could be issued.8 6 Developing countries also
80. In the light of efforts by countries such as the United States to "punish" countries that
attempted to exercise their rights under Article 31 and in light of a lawsuit filed against the South
African Government by a group of pharmaceutical companies, developing countries began to push
for a clarification of Article 31. Developing countries wanted a common understanding that
confirmed the right of governments to make use of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement
whenever the exercise of intellectual property rights resulted in barriers to the access of essential
drugs. At a TRIPS Council meeting of April 2-6, 2001, a decision was made, based on a proposal
by the Africa Group, to hold a special session to initiate discussions on the interpretation and
application of the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. See WTO, Council for TradeRelated Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Submission by the African Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras,India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, IP/C[W/296 (June 29, 2001) [hereinafter
Submission by the African Group], available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
81. Owen Lippert, A Sceptic's View of the TRIPS and Essential Medicines Debate, in TRIPS
AND HEALTHCARE: RETHNKING THE DEBATE 30, 33 (Int'l Pol'y Network July 2001), available at
http://www.policynetwork.net/uploaded/pdf/rethinkingthe-debate_0701 .pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. For example, see the websites of International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (www.ifpma.org) and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (www.phrma.org) for helpful information.
85. Submission by the African Group, supra note 80, paras. 15-16.
86. Several scholars support the position that the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the
grounds upon which compulsory licenses may be issued. See CORREA, supra note 48, at 89-90
(arguing that although the TRIPS Agreement refers to five specific grounds for the granting of
compulsory licenses, the Agreement "does not limit the Members' right to establish compulsory
licences on other grounds not explicitly mentioned"); see also WATAL, supra note 15, at 380
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pointed to the fact that some developed countries were "great users of
compulsory licences. ' 8 7
Domestic and international Non-Governmental Organizations
("NGOs") and AIDS support groups also argued that TRIPS put profit
over human lives in the developing world.8 8 By preventing the easy and
cheap copying of patented drugs, these groups argued, the TRIPS Agreement constrained the ability of developing countries to address immediate losses to the welfare of domestic consumers.89 The solution, they
argued, was compulsory licensing.
III.

THE DOHA DECLARATION AND THE 2003 DECISION ON
IMPLEMENTATION: A

REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL

TRADE LAW?

The Doha Declaration9" and the 2003 Decision on Implementation9 ' now appear to lay to rest the different debates regarding compulsory licensing. The 2003 Decision on Implementation was adopted by
the General Council in light of a "Statement of Understanding" read by
the Chairperson of the General Council of the WTO.92 In this section, I
will briefly highlight the key provisions of the Doha Declaration, update
readers on the Paragraph 6 question (the question left unaddressed in the
Doha Declaration), and extensively examine the 2003 Decision on
Implementation. In Part A, I examine the main provisions of the Doha
Declaration. In Part B, I highlight the main issues that arise from the
Paragraph 6 question. In Part C, I highlight and critically examine the
main provisions of the 2003 Decision on Implementation. In Part D, I
examine the main contours of the Statement of Understanding issued by
the Chairperson of the General Council. I will undertake a more
detailed evaluation of the merits and demerits of the 2003 Decision on
Implementation in Section IV.
A.

The Doha Declaration

The Doha Declaration reiterates the importance of an effective
(observing that "the final text of Article 31 places no restrictions on the purposes for which such
use [of a compulsory license] could be authorized").
87. Submission by the African Group, supra note 80, para. 29.

88. See Lippert, supra note 81, at 32.
89. Id.
90. See Doha Declaration, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
91. See 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
92. See WTO, The General Council Chairperson'sStatement (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Statement of Understanding], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news03-e/trips_

stat_28aug03_e.htm. The statement was read by Chairperson of the General Council Carlos P6rez
del Castillo, Uruguay's ambassador to the WTO. Id.
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intellectual property regime for the development of new medicines while
recognizing concerns regarding the effect of intellectual property on
drug prices.9 3 The Doha Declaration also stresses the need for the
TRIPS Agreement to "be part of the wider national and international
action" to address the "public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics." 94 Paragraph 4, one
the most ambitious provisions in the declaration, provides:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we
affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all. 95
Regarding the flexibilities permitted members under the TRIPS
Agreement to promote access to medicine, the Doha Declaration reaffirms "the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in
the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. "96
Specifically addressing compulsory licenses, the Doha Declaration states
that, "[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted,"9 7 and that in deciding to grant compulsory licenses, "[e]ach
Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency.''9s
The Doha Declaration was undoubtedly a victory for developing
countries. The declaration is most useful to countries with sufficient
local technological, productive, and regulatory capacity to support
generic industries.9 9 Moreover, even if a country has the capacity to
support local production, it may be "economically inefficient to require
domestic production for every medicine a country may need. '"' ° For
countries with insufficient manufacturing capacity and countries whose
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Doha Declaration, supra note 9, para. 3.
Id. paras. 1-2.
Id. para. 4.
Id.
Id. para. 5(b) (emphasis added).
Id. para. 5(c) (emphasis added).
See Sun, supra note 4, at 107-08.
Id. at 109.
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generic industries may not operate on an economy of scale for every
drug required domestically, the obvious solution is to import generic
drugs manufactured under compulsory licenses from other countries.
However, the Doha Declaration did not decide the question of whether
such importation of generic drugs manufactured under compulsory
licenses was permitted. Rather, Paragraph 6 reads:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council
before the end of 2002.JJ
The Paragraph 6 issue triggered another year of debates, discussions, and negotiations in the WTO. Although the TRIPS Council considered a draft decision at the end of December 2002, and despite
approaching the year-end deadline stipulated in the Doha Declaration,
the issue remained unresolved as a result of the inability of WTO Members to reach a consensus.
B.

The Paragraph6 Question

The Paragraph 6 question arises because of a restriction contained
in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. 10 2 Article 31(f) appears to
prohibit the export of products manufactured under a compulsory license
by specifying that compulsory licenses must be authorized predominantly to supply the domestic market of that authorizing Member. The
rationale behind Article 31(0 "lies in the territorial nature of patent law
and in the need to avoid circumvention of patent rules."' 0 3
As a result of Article 31(f), uses permitted by a compulsory license
are limited to those aimed at predominantly supplying the domestic market of the WTO Member granting such a license. Although Article 31(f)
does allow a non-predominant part of the pharmaceutical product manufactured under compulsory license to be exported, difficulties arise
101. Doha Declaration, supra note 9, para. 6.
102. Article 31 begins: "Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected." TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31. Among the provisions is Article 31(f), which states that "any
such use shall be authorized predominantlyfor the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use." Id. art. 31(f) (emphasis added).

103. See WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Paragraph6 of the
Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Communication from the
European Communities and Their Member States, IP/C/W/352 para. 3 (June 20, 2002)
[hereinafter EC Communication Relating to Paragraph 61, available at http://www.wto.org/

english/docs e/docse.htm.
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where a country lacking domestic manufacturing capability is seeking to
import massive quantities of generic drugs from the manufacturing
country. As stated by the United States in its communication to the
WTO:
Difficulties could arise, therefore, when a country with insufficient
domestic manufacturing capacity and experiencing grave health
problems seeks to import a needed pharmaceutical from a manufacturer in a WTO Member where a patent exists on that pharmaceutical.
In this situation, it currently would be inconsistent with Article 31(f)
for that WTO Member to grant a compulsory license to its manufacturer to produce the drug solely for export to the country that has
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sec10 4
tor. It is this situation that the TRIPS Council must address.
WTO Members disagreed on the procedural mechanism needed to
address the problem as well as the substantive solution that was needed
to address the problem. At a March 2002 TRIPS Council meeting, four
different solutions were proposed: (1) an authoritative interpretation of
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement;" 5 (2) an amendment to Article 31
in order to overcome the Article 31 (f) restriction;' 6 (3) a moratorium on
dispute settlement with regard to the non-respect of the restriction under
Article 31(f);0 7 and (4) a temporary waiver with regard to Article
104. WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Paragraph6 of the Doha
Declarationon the TRIPS and Public Health: Second Communicationfrom the United States, IP/
C/W/358 para. 9 (July 9, 2002) [hereinafter Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph
6], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/docs e.htm.
105. Article 30 provides that "Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." TRIPS Agreement, supra note
4, art. 30. An authoritative interpretation of Article 30 would have recognized the right of a WTO
member to manufacture a patented drug for export to another country facing a public health crisis
without having to resort to compulsory licensing. Numerous NGOs supported this solution.
Article XX:2 of the WTO Agreement stipulates the procedure for adopting official interpretation.
WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XX:2.
106. An amendment to Article 31 would have been in the form of a new paragraph which
would carve out exceptions to the restrictions imposed by Article 31(f). The European
Communities ("EC") supported this solution, arguing that "[t]he insertion of a textual provision
into the TRIPS Agreement itself has the advantage of providing for a straightforward, clear,
legally secure, effective and permanent solution within an existing legal framework, i.e. Article 31
of the TRIPS Agreement." EC Communication Relating to Paragraph6, supra note 103, para. 5;
see also WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Concept PaperRelating to
Paragraph6 of the Doha DeclarationCommunicationfrom the European Communities and their
Member States, IP/C/W/339 paras. 16-22 (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docse/docse.htm.
107. See EC CommunicationRelating to Paragraph6, supra note 103, para. 6. A moratorium
on dispute settlement would have operated as a pledge by WTO Members not to challenge any
member that fails to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 31(f). The United States initially
proposed and strongly supported this solution.
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10 8

C.

The 2003 Decision on Implementation

The 2003 Decision on Implementation takes the form of a provisional waiver to Article 31(f) and allows countries to export generic

drugs to third countries with no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.1" 9 The Decision pertains only to pharmaceutical products. 10 It lays out the obligation of exporting members, eligible
importing members, other members of the WTO, and the TRIPS Coun-

cil. The Decision includes safeguards against abuse and trade diversion
and lays down rules to ensure transparency. The Decision also contains
provisions on transfer of technology and regional cooperation. The

main provisions of the Decision can be delineated through seven different features.
1.

QUALIFYING COUNTRIES: WHICH COUNTRIES WILL BENEFIT FROM
THE SYSTEM? WHICH COUNTRIES ARE EXCLUDED?

Only "eligible importing Members" can utilize the 2003 Decision
on Implementation. Eligible importing members include "any leastdeveloped country Member, and any other Member that has made a
notification to the Councilfor TRIPS of its intention to use the system as
an importer.""' The category of importing members is potentially
broad. The only requirement is that a country wishing to use the system
files a notification of intent with the TRIPS Council. Some countries,
mostly industrialized, have voluntarily decided not to use the system as
importing Members." 2
108. See id.
109. Paragraph 2 provides that "[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under Article 3 1(f)
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence to
the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export
to an eligible importing Member(s)." 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 2.
110. Id. at pmbl.
11. Id. para. 1(b) (emphasis added).
112. Paragraph 1 notes that "some Members will not use the system set out in this Decision as
importing Members and that some other Members have stated that, if they use the system, it
would be in no more than situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency." Id. See also footnote 3 to paragraph 1(b) of the Decision, listing the Members that will
not use the Decision as importing Members as: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of
America. Id. at n.3; see also Statement of Understanding,supra note 92:
Until their accession to the European Union, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia agree that
they would only use the system as importers in situations of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency. These countries further agree that upon
their accession to the European Union, they will opt out of using the system as
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An "exporting Member" is simply "a Member using the system set
out in this Decision to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export
them to, an eligible importing Member."' 1 3 It appears to mean that any
country with manufacturing capacities, including industrialized countries, can export under this system.
2.

QUALIFYING PRODUCTS: WHICH PRODUCTS ARE COVERED BY THIS
SYSTEM? WHAT ABOUT VACCINES?

The Decision is strictly limited to pharmaceutical products, which
are defined in paragraph 1 as "any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed
to address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the
Declaration."' 1 4 Active ingredients necessary for the manufacture of the
pharmaceutical products and diagnostic kits needed for their use are also
included in this definition. The definition of patented products appears
to be broad enough to allow countries to address legitimate public health
needs and would extend to vaccines.
3.

QUALIFYING DISEASES: WHAT IS THE DISEASE SCOPE OF
THE DECISION?

The Decision does not contain a list of qualifying diseases for
which the waiver may be used: this is a major victory for developing
countries. An effort by the U.S. to limit the disease coverage led to a
major deadlock in negotiations and made it impossible for WTO Members to meet the 2002 year-end deadline stipulated in the Doha Declaration. In a January 7, 2003 letter to Ministers of the WTO, the European
Union ("EU") Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, suggested a compromise deal.' 5 The EU proposed that the mechanism apply to an initial list of infectious epidemics "which are generally recognised by
health experts as those which have the most damaging impact on developing countries," with an added suggestion that Members wishing to
import medicines to meet a public health concern not explicitly covered
in an initial list be encouraged to seek the advice of the World Health
Organization ("WHO"). 116 The proposal by the European Communities
[S]ome other Members have agreed that they would only use the
importers ....
system as importers in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency: Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico,
Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, United Arab Emirates.
Id.
113. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 1(c).
114. Id. para. l(a).
115. Letter from Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, to WTO Ministers, (Jan. 7, 2003), at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/medecine/docs/plletter.pdf.
116. Id.; see also EU Seeks to Break the Current Deadlock on WTO Access to Medicines: a
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("EC") was subsequently rejected.
4.

CONDITION PRECEDENT TO USING THE SYSTEM: WILL BENEFICIARY
COUNTRIES NEED PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FROM THE WTO TO
USE THE SYSTEM?

Generally, prior authorization of the TRIPS Council is not required
before a member can utilize the mechanisms established by the Decision.117 However, the Decision does require that both importing and
exporting countries file some notification with the Council for TRIPS. 1 8
Countries other than LDCs that intend to use the system as importers
must establish that they have no manufacturing capacity and notify the
9
WTO accordingly. I"

The Decision also lays down specific requirements that both
importing and exporting countries utilizing the system must satisfy.'
Essentially, all countries have an obligation to ensure that medicines
produced under the system are used for their intended purpose and are
not diverted to other countries where they could compete with brandname drugs manufactured by the original patent owner.
a) Obligation of Importing Countries: An eligible importing Member must make a prior notification to the Council for TRIPS specifying
the "names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed,"' 12 ' confirming that the eligible importing Member in question "has established
that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question,"' 122 and confirming that,
Multilateral Solution is Needed, Europa - The European Union On-Line (Jan. 9, 2003), at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/pr090103-en.htm. The proposal submitted by the EU outlined
twenty-three infectious diseases that the EC believed had the most damaging impact on
developing countries. In addition to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, the following
additional diseases were suggested: Yellow fever, plague, cholera, meningococcal disease,
African trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, leishmaniasis, hepatitis, leptospirosis, pertussis,
poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, typhoid fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, haemorrhagic fevers,
and arboviruses. Id.
117. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 1(b) n.2 ("It is understood that this
notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system set out in this
Decision.").
118. Id. para. 2.
119. Id. para. 2(a)(ii).
120. Id. para. 1.
121. Id. para. 2(a)(i).
122. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 2(a)(ii). This requirement is
waived for LDCs. The Annex to the Decision sets out two ways that a country can establish that it
has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector:
Least-developed country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. For other eligible importing
Members insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in question
may be established in either of the following ways:
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"where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has
granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence in accordance with
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of this
Decision." '2 3
Importing Members have an obligation to prevent re-exportation of
the products that have been imported into their territory under the system. To ensure that the products imported under the system are used for
the specified public health purposes underlying their importation, eligible importing Members are required to "take reasonable measures within
their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the
risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the products that have
actually been imported into their territories under the system."12' 4
b) Obligation of Exporting Countries: Several obligations are
imposed on exporting countries utilizing the system. First, such an
exporting country must first issue a compulsory license in accordance
with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Second, the compulsory
license issued by the exporting Member must contain certain conditions.
It must stipulate that "only the amount necessary to meet the needs of
the eligible importing Member(s) may be manufactured under the
licence and the entirety of this production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS."' 2 5 It must
also stipulate that "products produced under the licence shall be clearly
identified as being produced under the system set out in [the Decision on
Implementation] through specific labelling or marking."1 26 The exporting country must also require that suppliers "distinguish such products
through special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not
have a significant impact on price."' 27 Finally, an exporting country
must require that before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a
website "the quantities being supplied to each destination"' 28 and "the
(i) the Member in question has established that it has no manufacturing capacity in
the pharmaceutical sector; or
(ii) where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in this, it has examined
this capacity and found that excluding any capacity owned or controlled by the
patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of meeting its needs.
When it is established that such capacity has become sufficient to meet the
Member's needs, the system shall no longer apply.
Id. at annex.
123. Id. para. 2(a)(iii).
124. Id. para. 4.
125. Id. para. 2(b)(i).
126. Id. para. 2(b)(ii).
127. Id.
128. Id. para. 2(b)(iii).
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' 129
distinguishing features of the product(s)."
A third requirement placed on an exporting member pertains to
notification. An exporting Member is required to notify the Council for
130
TRIPS of the grant of the license and the conditions attached to it.
Finally, an exporting member who has granted a compulsory license
under this system has an obligation to pay "adequate remuneration" to
the patent holder pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement. 3 '
c) Obligations Imposed on Other WTO Members: All WTO Members are required to take necessary measures to prevent diversion.1 32
Members also agree not to challenge actions taken by countries under
this Decision. Paragraph 10 stipulates that "Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of the waivers contained in this Decision under subparagraphs l(b) and l(c) of
Article XXIII of GATT7 1994."' 1

5.

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DIVERSION

Measures against diversion are directed at preventing goods from
being diverted from their intended purpose. In the course of negotiations on the Paragraph 6 issue, pharmaceutical companies expressed fear
that cheaper drugs produced under compulsory licenses may be diverted
to rich country markets where a different pricing system exists. To
address this, all WTO Members are obliged to "ensure the availability of
effective legal means to prevent the importation into, and sale in, their
territories of products produced under the system set out in this Decision
and diverted to their markets inconsistently with its provisions, using the
13 4
means already required to be available under the TRIPS Agreement."
6.

SURVEILLANCE AND REVIEW MECHANISM

The Council for TRIPS assumes a new monitoring role under the
Decision. Paragraph 8 stipulates that the Council for TRIPS "shall
review annually the functioning of the system set out in this Decision
with a view to ensuring its effective operation and shall annually report
on its operation to the General Council."' 3 5 The notifications required
129. Id.
130. Id. para. 2(c) ("The information provided shall include the name and address of the
licensee, the product[s] for which the licence has been granted, the quantit[ies] for which it has
been granted, the countr[ies] to which the product[s] [are] to be supplied and the duration of the
licence.").
131. Id. para. 3.
132. Id. para. 5.
133. Id. para. 10.
134. Id. para. 5.
135. Id. para. 8.
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of exporting and importing countries also go to the Council for TRIPS.
7.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

The Decision recognizes the desirability of promoting technology
transfer and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to
overcome the Paragraph 6 problem. Consequently, the Decision calls on
eligible importing Members and exporting Members to use the system in
a manner that would promote the objective of technology transfer. Paragraph 7 contains a vague statement in which "Members undertake to
cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of technology and
136
capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector."
D.

The Statement of Understanding

The original draft of the Decision was unacceptable to the U.S. and
to the pharmaceutical industry.1 37 To achieve a much needed consensus
on the Paragraph 6 question, it became necessary for the Chairperson of
the General Council to adopt a statement to accompany the Decision.
The Statement of Understanding was issued essentially to placate the
United States and the pharmaceutical industry and to ensure that WTO
Members arrived at a consensus before the biennial meeting of the WTO
Ministerial Conference. The Statement of Understanding has four
important clauses: a good faith clause, an anti-diversion clause, a transparency clause, and a peaceful and expeditious settlement of dispute
clause.
According to the Statement, WTO Members "recognize that the
system that will be established by the Decision should be used in good
faith to protect public health and . . .not be an instrument to pursue
industrial or commercial policy objectives."' 3 8 The Statement also contains an understanding among Members that the Decision's purpose
136. Id. para. 7.
137. When a draft of the Decision (known as the "Motta text") was circulated in December
2002, the United States was the only country that refused to endorse the text. On top of the Motta
text provisions, the U.S. government demanded that any solution to the Paragraph 6 problem be
restricted to "humanitarian use" (a vague clause that many feared could disqualify normal generic
production), include an "opt-out" clause, which would hinder the economic viability of the
solution, impose heavier burdens on suppliers to change the packaging of products made under the
system, and incorporate a "review mechanism" to monitor the diversion of generics back into
wealthy markets. See Joint Press Release, M6decins Sans Fronti~res, Oxfam, Health Action
Network, Third World Network & Consumer Project on Technology, US Seeks Further
Restrictions on Generic Medicines for Developing Countries (Aug. 25, 2003) (discussing how
several NGO's involved in the Paragraph 6 question have found additional demands by the U.S. to
be a threat to the access of poor countries to needed medicines because they constitute a
"redundant layer of bureaucracy that can easily be manipulated to pressure countries out of the
system"), available at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pr030825 TRIPShealth.htm.
138. Statement of Understanding, supra note 92.

2005] PATENT WARS IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

231

would be defeated if products supplied under the Decision are diverted
from their intended markets. Consequently, Members agree that "all
reasonable measures should be taken to prevent such diversion in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Decision."' 39 The Statement,
however, specifically states that "[i]t is the understanding of Members
that in general special packaging and/or special colouring or shaping
should not have a significant impact on the price of pharmaceuticals.""14
The Statement also calls on Members to "seek. to resolve any issues
arising from the use and implementation of the Decision expeditiously
and amicably."' 4 1 To ensure transparency, the Statement of Understanding requires that notifications made under paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the Decision, pertaining to eligibility of an importing country, include
"information on how the Member in question had established ... that it
has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
142
sector."'
The Statement of Understanding also confirms the new monitoring
role of the TRIPS Council. Essentially, "[a]ny Member may bring any
matter related to the interpretation or implementation of the Decision,
including issues related to diversion, to the TRIPS Council for expeditious review, with a view to taking appropriate action."'' 4 3 Any WTO
Member who has concerns that the terms of the Decision have not been
fully complied with "may also utilise the good offices of the Director
General or Chair of the TRIPS Council, with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution.""'
E.

Conclusion

After all the battles over access to medicine and the relationship
between patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and public health, what
exactly has been achieved? What can countries that are members of the
WTO legitimately do to ensure that essential medicines are available and
affordable?
139. Id. The Statement notes that the provisions of paragraph 2(b)(ii), pertaining to the
obligations of exporting countries with respect to labeling, "apply not only to formulated
pharmaceuticals produced and supplied under the system but also to active ingredients produced
and supplied under the system and to finished products produced using such active ingredients."
Id.
140. Id. Regarding special packaging and labeling, the Statement notes the fact that in the past
and for different reasons, companies have developed procedures to prevent diversion of products.
Id. Attached to the Statement is a "Best practices" guideline that draws upon the experiences of
companies.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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WTO Members have at least four options. First, where patents
exist on a desired medicine, developing countries can still attempt to
meet their needs by dealing directly with the patent holder through normal commercial arrangements and through aid programs such as donations and discounts. 4 5 Second, where patents exist on a desired
medicine, a WTO Member with manufacturing capacity has the flexibility under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration to grant a
compulsory license to permit the manufacture of generic versions of the
same product. 146 Third, where a WTO Member has insufficient or no
manufacturing capability, such a Member can, without a compulsory
license, import generic pharmaceutical products manufactured in another
country provided there are no patents on the pharmaceutical in question
1 47
in the importing country and in the prospective exporting country.
Fourth, where there are patents in both the importing and exporting
country, compulsory licenses would need to be issued in both countries
before medicines could be exported.
Although the 2003 Decision on Implementation appears to be a victory for developing countries, its usefulness is yet to be tested. During
negotiations, the World Health Organization ("WHO") and civil society
groups had recommended a much simpler, workable, and more economically viable solution: allowing generic production for export as a limited exception to a patent right. There are fears that the Decision creates
a costly and cumbersome process that could ultimately discourage
generic production.

IV.

ACCESSING GAINS; MAPPING PROGRESS: THE MERITS AND

DEMERITS OF THE 2003 DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION

The objective of both the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision
on Implementation was to provide those in medicine-deprived countries
access to speedy and low-priced supplies of essential medicines, while
145. See Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph6, supra note 104, para. 7.
First, difficulty would be expected to arise only in situations where the supply of the
pharmaceutical in question has not been provided by the patent holder through
normal commercial arrangements or through discount, donation, or other aid
programs. A TRIPS-based solution can also only be expected to be effective where
Members have, or are provided, the resources necessary to procure pharmaceuticals
under the terms of a TRIPS-consistent compulsory licence, which includes the
provision of adequate remuneration to the patent holder.
Id.
146. See, e.g., id. para. 8.
147. In general, developing countries were not required to establish a patent protection regime
under the TRIPS Agreement until January 1, 2005. Thus, a developing country with
manufacturing capacity and no patent laws can manufacture and export patented drugs without a
compulsory license.
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maintaining a legal environment that rewards inventors for their investment and encourages research and development into new products. Several questions inevitably arise. Will the adoption of the Decision enable
countries in need of affordable medicines to import them quickly and
easily from generic manufactures in other countries? Is the solution
transparent and economically feasible? Will the Doha Declaration and
the Decision ensure that needed drugs are available on a sustained basis?
expeditious, workable,
Altogether, is the solution crafted in the Decision
48
transparent, sustainable, and legally certain?1
These questions are pertinent because although the 2003 Decision
of Implementation is seen in some quarters as a balanced solution to the
Paragraph 6 question,' 4 9 many NGOs are critical of the Decision. 15 0
Critics argue that the Decision is intended to:
148. See, e.g., Second Communicationfrom the U.S. on Paragraph6, supra note 104, para. 29

(arguing that "[w]hile each option suggested by Members has some merit, at this stage we believe
an expeditious, workable, transparent, sustainable and legally certain solution may more likely be
achieved through either a moratorium for dispute settlement or a waiver of the obligation in
TRIPS Article 31(f)").
149. For example, on August 30, 2003, Shannon Herzfeld, Senior Vice President of
International Affairs of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"),
issued a statement that read in part:
With the unanimous adoption of the Menon Statement and the Motta text, we are
pleased that these negotiations have come to a conclusion .... The two decisions
that the General Council reached today - the Motta text and the Chairman's
statement - will ensure that the system will not be abused. The additional
clarifications contained in the Chairman's statement add strong provisions to
prevent diversion, and increase the likelihood that the solution will benefit patients
in the world's poorest countries as envisioned in the Doha Declaration. Taken as a
whole, this solution reaffirms the critical role of patents in the development of new
medicines.
Press Release, The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Statement from
Shannon Herzfeld, PhRMA's Senior Vice President, International Affairs in reaction to the
successful conclusion of the negotiations on TRIPS and Public Health (Aug. 30, 2003), available
at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/30.08.2003.841 .cfm.
150. In a Joint NGO Statement issued on September 10, 2003, fourteen NGOs criticized
several aspects of the 2003 Decision on Implementation. According to the Joint NGO statement,
the main problems with the rules are:
1. The WTO is requiring the issuance of two compulsory licenses when the new
mechanism is used.
2. The WTO has added many constraints on the business practices of the generic
companies.
3. The WTO deal introduced an extra layer of uncertainty by stating that the system
should not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives,
creating uncertainty over the role that will be played by the businesses that
manufacture and sell generic drugs.
4. The decision leaves unclear whether or not economic efficiency is a grounds for
determining a lack of manufacturing capacity in the importing country. The lack
of clarity on this issue has been defended as a matter of "creative ambiguity", but
already the US is telling the Philippines and other countries that they will oppose
"economic efficiency" as grounds for allowing a country to import generics.
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[1] Limit the importance of the Doha Declaration,
[2] Prejudice more fundamental and sustainable fixes to the 31.f
problems,
[3] Create more and not less uncertainly [sic] regarding what can and
cannot be done,
[4] Give the US and the EU a big public relations bonanza which
will be cruelly use [sic] as the basis for more bilateral pressure
against the use of compulsory licenses and against better export
strategies, as well as a basis to leverage additional concessions
from developing countries in other WTO negotiations. 5 '
Overall, the belief is that "[t]he new agreement has very modest
bene' 52
fits, and it has very substantial costs, risks and uncertainties."'
In this Section, I focus specifically on the 2003 Decision on Implementation in part because the Doha Declaration has already been extensively analyzed in many law review articles. I review the Decision in
light of some of the perceived concerns of some of the NGOs. Three
main issues will be taken up. First, I examine the viability and sustainability of the waiver mechanism as a solution to the Paragraph 6
question. Second, I examine the nature of obligations imposed on prospective importing and exporting countries to determine whether they
are unnecessarily burdensome and onerous, and whether they present an
imposition on the sovereignty of a country. Finally, I explore those
areas where the Decision is vague and could potentially create problems
in the future for countries desiring to utilize the system.
A.

The Waiver Solution

Was the waiver solution the best possible solution to the Paragraph
6 question? 'Yes' and 'No.' The 2003 Decision on Implementation,
which operates as a temporary waiver, offers a quick solution to a thorny
5. The deal gives the WTO itself new authority to second guess and interfere in the
granting of individual compulsory licenses to generic companies.
6. The United States and other Developed Economies now have greater
opportunities to pressure and stop developing countries from issuing compulsory
licenses.
Joint NGO Statement on TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deal on Medicines: A "Gift" Bound in
Red Tape (Sept. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Joint NGO Statement], available at http://www.cptech.org/
ip/wto/p6/ngos09l02003.html. The statement was signed by the following organizations: ACT
Up Paris; Consumer Project on Technology; Consumers International; Essential Action; European
AIDS Treatment Group; Health Action International; Health GAP; International People's Health
Council; Mfdecins Sans Fronti~res; OXFAM International; People's Health Movement;
SEATINI; Third World Network; and Women in Development. Id.
151. Memorandum from James Love, CPTech, to WTO TRIPS Negotiators (Dec. 16, 2002)
(rejecting the new chairman's December 16, 2002 text for paragraph 6 negotiations) [hereinafter
CPTech Memo], at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptechl2l62002.html.
152. CPTech Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
CPTech Statement], at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptechO8302003.html. .
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problem but carries with it a lot of legal uncertainty.153 Compared to a
more formal amendment, a temporary waiver retains the advantage of
55
speed' 5 4 and simplicity.
Although the waiver solution has its advantages, an amendment
would have offered its own advantages of permanence, sustainability,
and legal certainty.S 6 However, an amendment would be undeniably
more time-consuming and difficult to achieve than a waiver.157 The
United States challenged the idea that an amendment would provide
legal certainty and opposed an amendment to Article 31(f) on the
grounds that actions of countries acting under an amendment would
which would have marred the
have been susceptible to legal challenges
1 58
legal certainty of the solution.
Some NGOs had suggested an authoritative interpretation of Article
30 as a solution. Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO
Members to provide limited exceptions to patent rights, "provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation
of the patent and do not unreasonablyprejudice the legitimate interests
153. See, e.g., EC Communications Relating to Paragraph6, supra note 103, para. 6 ("A

waiver or a dispute settlement moratorium could be appropriate and effective mechanisms for a
solution, but they may fall short of providing the type of sustainable and legally secure solution
that the EC are aiming for."); see also Amir Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph6 of the
Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for GreaterFlexibility
and a Non-JusticiabilitySolution, 17 EMORY INT'L L. Rav. 743, 767 (2003) (noting that a waiver

is only a temporary solution).
154. In the TRIPS Council, the United States has argued that:
[A]greement can be reached on a ... waiver much more easily and quickly than on
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement and further delay would be required for
Members' formal acceptance. Crafting an amendment on which all Members can
agree would delay implementation of the 'expeditious solution' beyond the agreed
deadline.
Second Communicationfrom the U.S. on Paragraph6, supra note 104, para. 29.

155. Id. ("Should an amendment be adopted, it could prove to be either ineffective or seriously
harmful in practice. A further amendment of the Agreement would be required to correct this
situation.").
156. See, e.g., EC CommunicationsRelating to Paragraph6, supra note 103, para. 5 (arguing

that an amendment "offer[ed] the best guarantees for a sustainable, balanced and workable
solution"); see also WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Concept Paper
Relating to Paragraph6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health:
Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, IP/C/W/339 (Mar. 4,

2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
157. See, e.g., EC Communications Relating to Paragraph6, supra note 103, para. 7. An

amendment to Article 31 would fall under the procedural rules set out by Article X of the
Marrakesh Agreement and is, as are all amendments of international agreements, a timeconsuming procedure. See id.
158. See Second Communicationfrom the U.S. on Paragraph6, supra note 104, para. 29

(arguing that "if a country begins production for export relying on either an authoritative
interpretation or an amendment, its actions could be challenged as being inconsistent with the
interpretation or amendment," and such "a country would only have full legal certainty after the
conclusion of a dispute process").
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of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties."159 Article 30 is seen to be politically more workable.' 60 Article 30 does not require a governmental decision each time a pharmaceutical product is needed and contains no stringent requirements such as
the requirement to notify a patent owner of use or to pay reasonable
remuneration to the patent holder.
The Article 30 solution was not favored by the United States or the
1
6
EC. ' Rejecting this solution, the U.S. argued that Article 30 is
"intended to apply to statutory exceptions already provided for in many
162
countries' laws at the time the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated,"'
and that interpreting the Article to allow Members "to amend their patent laws to permit compulsory licences to be granted to authorize their
manufacturers to produce and export patented pharmaceutical products
to other countries would both unreasonably conflict with the normal
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interexploitation of a patent and
' 163
owner."
patent
the
of
ests
The waiver solution is only temporary. Assessment of the wisdom
of the solution will depend on how speedily WTO Members can adopt a
more permanent amendment to Article 31(f). Although the Decision set
a deadline for WTO Members to negotiate and adopt such an amendment, '64judging by past negotiating practices at the WTO' 65 and serious
debates that preceded the adoption of the Decision, it could predictably
take much more time for Members to negotiate and adopt the necessary
amendments. If global corporate actors remain true to their form, they
will attempt to influence the negotiating position of developed countries
159. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, para. 30 (emphasis added).
160. See Attaran, supra note 4, at 870.
161. The EC rejected this idea, arguing that "an authoritative interpretation on Article 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement may fail to offer the same level of legal security for all parties involved as a
textual addition to Article 31(f) would do." EC Communications Relating to Paragraph6, supra
note 103, para. 6. The EC questioned the legal merit of the Article 30 solution and thought it was
doubtful "whether the criteria of Article 30 offer[ed] sufficient scope for such an exception." Id.
162. Second Communicationfrom the U.S. on Paragraph6, supra note 104, para. 31.
163. Id.
164. The Decision, including its waivers, "shall terminate for each Member on the date on
which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that
Member." 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 11. The Decision authorizes
the TRIPS Council to:
initiate by the end of 2003 work on the preparation of such an amendment with a
view to its adoption within six months, on the understanding that the amendment
will be based, where appropriate, on this Decision and on the further understanding
that it will not be part of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 45 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.
Id.
165. See Attaran, supra note 153, at 768 (predicting that negotiations could drag on for years).
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166
governments, thus prolonging the amendment process.

B.

The Conditions Attached

Does the Decision provide incentive for manufacturers to participate and to produce for export or does it de-incentivize generic production? Does the Decision contain onerous conditions that might
discourage countries from utilizing the system? Asia Russell of Health
GAP (an AIDS activist organization) has argued that the solution crafted
by the Decision "is a failure for people with AIDS, and people every'
because "[in the time it would
where dying of treatable diseases"167
conditions set out by the
take a generic company to comply with all the
' 168
U.S., a patent would likely expire anyway."
Under the Decision, there are at least six steps to acquiring needed
medicine through a compulsory license: 16 9
" Step 1: A prospective importing country must first seek a voluntary license from the patent owner; such a license is supposed to
be on commercially reasonable terms and for a commercially reasonable period of time.
" Step 2: If attempt to secure a voluntary license fails, an entity
must apply for a compulsory license to manufacture the medicine
locally.
• Step 3: Where the compulsory license is by a country that has no
capacity to manufacture the medicine locally and the country is
not a least-developing country, such a country must assess its
industry's capacity to produce the medicine locally, notify the
TRIPS Council of its determination that it has insufficient capacity or no capacity, and explain and justify its decision regarding
capacity.
• Step 4: An importing country must identify and notify a willing
exporter in a country that has sufficient capacity to manufacture
the needed medicine.
" Step 5: The prospective exporter must seek a compulsory license
from its own government. 170 In granting the license, the prospective exporting country must ensure that the conditions stipulated
166. MATrHEWS, supra note 22, at 6 (suggesting that global corporate actors will continue to
play a pivotal role in any future renegotiation of the TRIPS Agreements and that "[tiheir interests
are likely to be at the forefront of developed country perspectives on future requirements of
international intellectual property protection").
167. Press Release, Health Global Access Project, Bush Administration, Big Pharma about to
secure disastrous "solution" on access to medicines at the WTO, (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.healtbgap.org/press-releases/03/082803-HGAP PS-WTO-para6_aug3Otext.html.
168. Id.
169. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14.
170. It is possible that the exporter may be required first to seek a voluntary license from the
patent holder.
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in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement are met. One important
condition is that the exporting country must pay adequate compensation to the patent holder.
Step 6: If and when a license is granted, the exporter must take
adequate measures as stipulated in the Decision to prevent diversion. In particular, the exporter must: (a) produce only the
amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member; (b) export the entirety of the production to the Member(s) which notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS; (c)
clearly identify the products produced under the system through
specific labeling or marking, special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves; (d) before shipment
begins, post on a website the quantities being supplied to each
destination and the distinguishing features of the product(s).
1.

NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

The Decision creates a somewhat cumbersome procedure for countries with insufficient or no capacity, which does not exist for countries
with manufacturing capacity.' 7 ' Although the system is supposed to be
automatic, the TRIPS Council can second-guess a country's decision to
utilize the system and has enough of a mandate to interfere and scrutinize the granting of a compulsory license.172 Some NGOs have
expressed concern that the notification requirements would be used 7to3
increase bilateral pressure on weak importing and exporting countries. 1
Additionally, some organizations have argued that the Decision
authorizes unnecessary intrusion into sovereignty because it authorizes
the WTO Secretariat, the TRIPS Council, and the Chair of the TRIPS
Council to review the use of compulsory licensing in the most intimate
terms. Currently, scrutiny is required on two levels: to evaluate the basis
for a country's decision that it lacks manufacturing capacity, and to evaluate whether the obligations imposed on both the importing and exporting countries have been met. Some loss of sovereignty will be
171. See CPTech Statement, supra note 152.
The WTO secretariat, the TRIPS Council and the Chair of the TRIPS council will
now begin to routinely review the issuance of individual licenses, and the WTO will
now as a matter of expected practice, oversee the use of compulsory licensing in the
most intimate terms, looking at the terms of individual licenses, evaluating the basis
for deciding manufacturing capacity is insufficient, or reviewing or second guessing
any of the new terms and obligations that the new implementation language
introduces into the regulation of compulsory licensing of patents on medicines.
Id.
172. See Joint NGO Statement, supra note 150 (observing that Decision gives "the WTO itself
new authority to second guess and interfere in the granting of individual compulsory licenses to
generic companies").
173. See CPTech Memo, supra note 151, para. 3.
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inevitable. The Decision was negotiated on the good faith understanding that it was aimed at addressing the problem of countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. It therefore stands to reason that
some kind of review mechanism must be in place to ensure that countries utilizing the system are those for whom it was crafted.
A more troubling concern is the emergence of three classes of
states subject to three different rules in a multilateral system made up of
sovereign states and guided by the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The first class is comprised of states that choose to issue
compulsory licenses under Article 31 of the traditional TRIPS Agreements. These licenses will be subject to very minimal scrutiny but are
not immune from legal action via the WTO dispute settlement process.
The second class is made up of states that issue compulsory licenses
under the Doha Declaration. These licenses will be subject to some
measure of scrutiny and are also vulnerable to the possibilities of legal
action. The third class represents states with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity utilizing the system established under the 2003 Decision
on Implementation. These licenses will be subject to more intense scrutiny because the granting of a compulsory license under the Decision is
far more complicated than is the case under the TRIPS Agreement. In
return, however, countries utilizing this system receive some measure of
immunity from potential lawsuits.
2.

OTHER CONDITIONS

One problem that arises under the 2003 Decision on Implementation is the need for two separate compulsory licenses to effectuate one
import request. Where a pharmaceutical product is patented in both the
importing and exporting country, a compulsory license will have to be
issued in each country. In other words, compulsory licenses to both
exporters and importers would have to be negotiated and issued on a
country-by-country and drug-by-drug basis. A manufacturer desiring to
produce for export must therefore first obtain a compulsory license from
its home country and then ensure that a compulsory license is also issued
in the importing country. The granting of two compulsory licenses
could create delays due to bureaucratic red tape.

3.

MEASURES TO PREVENT ABUSES AND TRADE DIVERSION

From the beginning, developed countries expressed concern about
abuses and trade diversion' 7 4 and called for stringent preventive measures. The prevention of trade diversion, the EC argued, was "of major
174. See EC Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 103, para. 13 ("It will be in
the interest of all.., that these products would not be diverted from their intended destination and
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importance to guarantee the legal security of the right holders concerned
and to preserve the basic principles of the TRIPS Agreement."'' 75 This
explains the stringent conditions imposed on the exporting country and
generic drug companies in these countries. Under the system, generic
manufacturers must differentiate pill size, shape, and color from brandname products.
Are the safeguards on re-importation inappropriate? There is a
legitimate fear that the safeguards may prove too costly for developing
countries and generic manufacturers alike and may discourage the use of
compulsory licensing altogether.' 7 6 However, some anti-diversion measures are necessary. Generic drug companies are not paragons of virtue.
To prevent unscrupulous generic producers from exploiting the system
for their own personal gain, some safeguards are called for.
In conclusion, some of the conditions appear to be burdensome,
may impose unnecessary costs on a country wishing to utilize the system, and may delay the delivery of affordable medicine to people who
need it most - the sick and the dying. It becomes a procedural
nightmare when each condition has to be fulfilled over and over again
for each and every drug and for each and every country to which the
drug will be exported. The Decision appears to take this into account.
For example, it provides that
[i]n the event that an eligible importing Member that is a developing
country Member or a least-developed country Member experiences
difficulty in implementing this provision, developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical7 7and financial cooperation in order to facilitate its
implementation. 1
C.

Dangerous Vagueness

The fierce negotiation by countries such as the United States,
Japan, Switzerland, and the EU at the TRIPS Council to introduce
numerous limitations and conditions to an earlier draft of the Decision
suggests that the battle over the precise scope of the Decision may be far
from over. In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. government
pushed for strong limitations, including a fixed list of diseases, restriction of the use of the system to emergency situations, and limits on eligible importing countries.' 78 A major concern at the present moment is
that the system would not be abused for purposes other than to provide pharmaceutical products
...to those in need.").
175. Id.
176. See CPTech Memo, supra note 151, para. 5.
177. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 4.
178. See MtDECINS SANS FRONTItRES, DOHA DERAILED: A PROGREss REPORT ON TRIPS AND
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that some countries may now attempt to exploit the lacunas in the Doha
1 79
Declaration and the Decision in furtherance of their narrow interest.
1.

THE SCOPE OF DISEASES

The Decision is silent on disease scope. It is not clear whether the
system can be used to address routine public health problems or whether
it is limited to epidemics and other major health emergencies.
The preamble to the Decision makes reference to the Doha Declaration.180 This could mean that the product scope will be defined by paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration."' The first paragraph of the Doha
Declaration reads: "We recognize the gravity of the public health
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics."18' 2
On the other hand, the Statement of Understanding is very telling.
The Statement of Understanding explicitly notes that some countries
will only use the system "in situations of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency."' 8 3 It can thus be deduced that the
system will normally apply to non-emergencies (including routine public health care). It would be most unwise to restrict the solution to
medicines and medical technologies for the treatment of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria because "[w]hile there is no doubt that these
epidemics are ravaging developing countries, they cannot be considered
the sole public health threats in poor regions - either now or in the
'184

future."

TO MEDICINES 3 (2003) (observing in their briefing for the 5th WTO Ministerial
Conference in Canctin that the proposed list of diseases suggested by the U.S. had no public health
rationale) [hereinafter DOHA DERAILED], available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/
cancunbriefing.pdf.
179. See CPTech Memo, supra note 151, para. 1 ("Lack of clarity has not been useful for
developing countries, and whatever is unclear will work against the developing countries.").

AccEsS

180. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14.

Noting the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the
"Declaration") and, in particular, the instruction of the Ministerial Conference to the
Council for TRIPS contained in paragraph 6 of the Declaration to find an
expeditious solution to the problem of the difficulties that WTO Members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement and to
report to the General Council before the end of 2002.
Id. at pmbl. (citations omitted).
181. See EC Communications Relating to Paragraph6, supra note 103, para. II (suggesting
that the product scope is already defined by the Doha Declaration).
182. Doha Declaration,supra note 9, para. 1.
183. Statement of Understanding,supra note 92.

184. Handout, CPTech, US Government efforts to limit the scope of diseases in the
implementation of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health have outraged the public
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ELIGIBLE IMPORTING MEMBERS

It is evident that LDCs qualify to use the system. The more difficult question arises with respect to other developing countries. Where a
WTO Member is a large (disease-burdened), middle-income country
such as Brazil, the Philippines, or South Africa, problems may arise
because it may be difficult for such a country to prove to the satisfaction
of the TRIPS Council that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. The Decision also "leaves unclear whether or not economic effi-

ciency is a grounds for determining a lack of manufacturing capacity in
the importing country."185

3.

MORATORIUM ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION?

It is not clear whether members who utilize the system are completely immune from lawsuits under the WTO dispute settlement procedure. The Decision appears to create a non-binding moratorium by
providing that "Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of the waivers contained in this Decision." '86
Much will depend on who has the final say on whether measures have
been taken in conformity with the Decision and by what standard such
determinations are made. Although the reviewing function rests with
the Council for TRIPS, 87 it bears remembering that membership in the
Council is open to representatives of all WTO Members.' 8 8 The provision on moratorium falls short of an earlier suggestion that a legally
binding moratorium is what was needed - a clear determination that
actions taken under Article 31(f) would have been non-justiciable.' 8 9
health community, and have been presented in a highly dishonest way by the White House and
USTR, damaging US reputation abroad (March 5, 2003) (quoting Allan Rosenfield, MD, Dean,
Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University; Michael H. Merson, MD, Dean of Public
Health, Yale University; Laurence G. Branch, Ph.D, Dean, College of Public Health, University of
Southern Florida; Stephen M. Shortell, Ph.D, Dean, School of Public Health, University of
California, Berkeley), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech03052003.html.
185. Joint NGO Statement, supra note 150.
186. 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 10 (emphasis added).
187. Id. para. 8 ("The Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the system
set out in this Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation and shall annually report on
its operation to the General Council.").
188. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. IV, § 5.
189. See Attaran, supra note 4, at 871 (proposing that the Paragraph 6 mandate was "better
satisfied by a rule of non-justiciability, narrowly tailored to deal with the manufacture and export
of generic" drugs). According to Attaran, the distinction between moratoriums and nonjusticiability is clear:
[Wihereas moratoriums are unilateral and not legally binding, non-justiciability
would be multilateral and fully legally binding. This is because where the
moratorium is only a promise not to bring a lawsuit[,] . . .non-justiciability is a
guarantee that those violations do not result in a lawsuit ... before the WTO panels
in the future.

2005] PATENT WARS IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

243

Clearly, several provisions of the 2003 Decision could pose major
problems for countries wishing to utilize the mechanism established
under it because of the ambiguities inherent in those provisions. The
situation is made worse by the fact that the legal status of the Statement
of Understanding accompanying the Decision is not entirely clear.
According to the Chairperson of the General Council, the Statement of
Understanding "represents several key shared understandings of Members regarding the Decision . . . and the way in which it will be interpreted and implemented." '1 90
D.

Conclusion

On the positive side, the very fact that 146 WTO Members were
able to arrive at a measure of consensus in order to address the concerns
of countries with insufficient or no capacity is commendable. Also on
the positive side is the fact that the scope of diseases for compulsory
licensing does not appear to be limited, as the U.S. initially suggested. It
is also encouraging that a balance was met between importers and
exporters as some of the conditions attached to the Decision are necessary to ensure that cheaper drugs do not flow back from developing
countries to developed countries, and to ensure that pharmaceutical companies recoup their investments.
Some of the fears expressed by several NGOs are unfounded and
lack merit. For example, some organizations have argued that the Decision "introduced an extra layer of uncertainty by stating that the system
should not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy
objectives, creating uncertainty over the role that will be played by the
businesses that manufacture and sell generic drugs."' 19' They have
argued that the 2003 Decision on Implementation "contradicts the basic
principles of the WTO and free trade"' 92 by prohibiting the export of
drugs manufactured under the system to rich countries.' 93 The argument
is that by reducing the size of countries that might import generic
medicine to meet their public health needs, it may not be cost-efficient
for any generic manufacturer to participate in the system. 194 These orgaAttaran, supra note 153, at 770.
190. Statement of Understanding,supra note 92.
191. Joint NGO Statement, supra note 150.
192. Id.
193. Id. at n.1 (arguing that the Decision "explicitly accepts a protectionist framework, where
rich countries can export to poor countries, but 23 rich countries were allowed to bar imports from
developing countries").
194. See Discussion Paper, Brook K. Baker, Health GAP, Vows of Poverty, Shrunken
Markets, Burdensome Manufacturing and Other Nonsense at the WTO (Sept. 27, 2003) (noting
that "23 rich countries, representing 80% of global drug sales opted out of the export/import
option, [and that] ten countries seeking admission to the E.U. have also restricted their option to
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nizations would want generic producers to be allowed to export drugs
produced under the new system to developed countries such as the U.S.,
Japan, or Australia on the argument that if such large markets are
excluded, drug production will not be economically efficient and attractive to generic firms. 9 5 These lines of argument lack merit and ignore
the good-faith understanding on which the Decision was negotiated.
Because the Decision was crafted to address the health problems of

countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, there is no reason for products manufactured under the system to be shipped to rich

countries.
In the future, controversy may arise regarding the effect of the
Statement of Understanding. It is currently not clear if and to what
extent it eviscerates the Doha Declaration and if and to what extent it
detracts from the terms and conditions of the Decision. 196 Three clauses
in the Statement of Understanding could pose a problem in the future:
the good-faith clause,' 9 7 the anti-diversion clause, and the transparency
clause.

V.

ABUSES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
EMERGING CASE LAW (THE

U.S.

A

REVIEW OF

EXAMPLE)

A troubling scenario is unfolding in the pharmaceutical sector in
the U.S.: pharmaceutical companies are increasingly resorting to a range
of abusive and anti-competitive practices in an effort to preserve monopoly profits and maintain market share. By exploiting loopholes in a law
import"), available at http://www.healthgap.org/press-releases/03/092703-HGAP-BP WTO_
Cancun.html.
195. See DOHA DERAILED, supra note 178, at 3 (suggesting that it is essential to include large
markets such as South Africa and Philippines in order to make drug production attractive to
generic firms); See also CPTech Statement, supra note 152.
The persons who have negotiated this agreement have given the world a new model
for explicitly endorsing protectionism. The United States, Europe, Canada,
Australia, Japan and other developed economies will be allowed to bar imports from
developing country generic suppliers - under completely irrational protectionist
measures that are defended by the WTO Secretariat and its most powerful members
as a humanitarian gesture.
Id.
196. See Baker, supra note 194 (arguing that the Statement of Understanding eviscerates the
historic Doha Declaration).
197. The good faith clause reads: "Members recognize that the system that will be established
by the Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health and, without prejudice to
paragraph 6 of the Decision, not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy
objectives." Id. (citing Statement of Understanding, supra note 92). Baker notes that there is
confusion in the international press and NGO community about the text's good faith requirement.
For example, there are speculations on whether it is "designed to limit drug use in the importing
country to public, non-commercial use" and whether it "applies to both locally produced generics
and imported ones." Baker, supra note 194 (citations omitted).
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originally passed to facilitate the speedy entry of generic drugs into U.S.
markets, some pharmaceutical companies have been able to either suppress or delay generic competition.
The goal of this part is to highlight the different ways pharmaceutical companies (both brand-name and generic) have attempted to "game"
a system originally designed to increase generic competition and
improve consumer welfare. By exploiting loopholes in a law passed to
increase generic competition, drug manufacturers in the U.S. have
become more profitable without providing any corresponding benefit to
consumers.19 8 The degree of abuse in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
is reflected in the increasing number of private lawsuits against brandname companies and/or generic companies for abuse of patent rights.
Abuse is also reflected in the growing number of antitrust enforcement
actions affecting both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers that
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is pursuing.' 9 9
Although the U.S. law at issue is very different from the international agreements under consideration in this article, interesting parallels
and useful lessons may be drawn. Many U.S. pharmaceutical companies
operate as giant transnational corporations and are likely to be affected
by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation.
Given the tendency of these companies to game a domestic system
designed to improve generic competition despite the strong regulatory
oversight of the FTC and the rigorous antitrust laws in the U.S., I argue
that those pharmaceutical companies affected by the Doha Declaration
and the 2003 Decision on Implementation may also attempt to abuse the
system established under these instruments absent strong oversight at the
global level.
To appreciate the tactics used by pharmaceutical companies to
either delay or suppress generic competition in the U.S., an understanding of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
2°
Cosmetic Act ("Hatch-Waxman Amendments" or "Hatch-Waxman")
is necessary. Enacted in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments sub198. PreparedStatement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on

the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (June 17, 2003) (prepared statement presented by Timothy J. Muris,
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter PreparedStatement of the FTC 2003],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/O6/030617pharmtestimony.htm.
199. The FTC "enforces federal consumer protection laws that prevent fraud, deception and
unfair business practices... [and] enforces federal antitrust laws that prohibit anticompetitive...
practices that restrict competition and harm consumers." FED. TRADE COMM'N, GUIDE TO THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 (April 2004), availableat www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/
guidetoftc.htm.
200. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman
Amendments].
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stantially changed the law governing approval of generic drug products
by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 0 ' One of the goals of
Hatch-Waxman was to increase opportunities for market entry by
generic drug manufacturers. 2 Although the goal of increasing generic
drug entry was achieved,20 3 studies now show that the two main HatchWaxman provisions governing generic drug approval prior to patent
expiration have potential for abuse and are susceptible to strategies that
may actually prevent the availability of more generic drugs. 2" In April
2002, the FTC began an industry-wide study that focused on certain
aspects of generic drug competition under Hatch-Waxman. The FTC
issued its report, Generic Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC
Study, in July 2002.205
One popular form of abuse is through anti-competitive agreements
between brand-name and generic drug companies.2 0 6 Another form of
abuse is the improper listing of patents by brand-name companies coupled with frivolous lawsuits against generic companies, which have the
effect of delaying FTC approval of a generic drug. Some companies
also engage in false and deceptive advertising and marketing practices
aimed solely at discouraging use of generic drugs once they are on the
market. In this section, Part A provides an overview of Hatch-Waxman.
Part B analyzes some of the abuses in the drug industry and the antitrust
action the FTC is taking against offending companies. In Part C, I highlight useful lessons that may be drawn from the United States.
A.

The Hatch-Waxman Amendment: Statutory and
Regulatory Background

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the "Act") regulates the
manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs in the U.S. 0 7
201. See
STUDY

FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN

4-8 (July 2002) [hereinafter FTC,

GENERIC DRUG ENTRY],

FTC

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/

genericdrugstudy.pdf.
202. See id. at i.
203. See id. ("Generic drugs now comprise more than 47 percent of the prescriptions filled for
pharmaceutical products - up from 19 percent in 1984, when Hatch-Waxman was enacted."); see
also FAMILIES USA, THE DRUG INDUSTRY: FACTS AND FIGURES (2002) (noting that consumers'
access to lower-priced generics has increased since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendment) [hereinafter FAMILIES USA, THE DRUG INDUSTRY], available at http://www.
familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/factsheet.pdf?doclD=246.
204. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 201, at i.
205. Id.
206. The goal of the study was to determine whether some provisions of Hatch-Waxman are
susceptible to strategies that delay and deter consumer access to low-cost generic drugs and
whether alleged anti-competitive agreements between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers
that relied on certain Hatch-Waxman provisions were isolated instances or more typical. Id. at 1.
207. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 [hereinafter "the Act"].
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Recognizing that the Act's "cumbersome drug approval process delayed
entry of relatively inexpensive generic drugs into the marketplace, Congress passed the . . . 'Hatch-Waxman Amendments' to the [Act] in
"
1984. 12o8
One of the rationales behind the Hatch-Waxman Amendments

was to make generic drugs more readily available.2 °9 In fact, the HatchWaxman Amendments embody Congress' attempt to "balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to
make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper,
21
generic copies of those drugs to market.
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments established new guidelines that
simplify the approval process for generic drugs. Previously, any company wanting to market a new generic drug had to secure approval from
the FDA by filing a New Drug Application ("NDA"), a process that is
often "time-consuming and costly" because it required companies to
submit specific data concerning the drug's safety and effectiveness."
Under the new guidelines, a generic drug manufacturer can file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") that incorporates by reference the safety and efficacy data developed and previously submitted
by the company that manufactured the original "pioneer" brand-name
drug. To obtain FDA approval, the ANDA filer must demonstrate that
its product is "bioequivalent" to the pioneer drug.21 2 To protect the patent rights of the pioneer drug manufacturer, the ANDA filer must make
one of four certifications2" 3 in its ANDA concerning patents listed with
the FDA for the pioneer drug, including that: 21 4 (1) no patent for the
pioneer drug is listed in the Orange Book ("Paragraph I Certification");
(2) the relevant patent listed in the Orange Book has expired ("Paragraph II Certification"); (3) the listed patent will expire on a particular
date and the ANDA filer does not seek FDA approval before that date
("Paragraph III Certification"); and (4) the listed patent "is invalid or
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic]
208. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2000).
209. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857 (I), at 14 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 2647, 2647.

210. Mylan, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (citations omitted).
211. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 801 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(citations omitted).
212. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
213. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A) (2004).
214. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments require an NDA to list any patent "which claims the
drug ... or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug." 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). The FDA maintains and
publishes this information in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations (commonly referred to as the "Orange Book"). See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY,
supra note 201, at 5; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)((7)(A) (2000).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:203

drug" ("Paragraph IV Certification"). 1 5
From a consumer interest standpoint and the standpoint of competition, an ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification is dangerous in that it
can, and frequently does, set in motion a process that could ultimately
delay access to cheaper generics for three years or longer. The regulatory implication of a Paragraph IV Certification is significant in that
such an application has the potential to trigger the operation of two provisions of Hatch-Waxman: the "30-month stay" and the "180-day period
of exclusivity."
1.

THE 30-MONTH STAY

An ANDA containing a Paragraph IV Certification (an "ANDA
IV") has "important legal ramifications [because] [i]t automatically creates a cause of action for patent infringement."2 1 6An ANDA applicant
making such a certification must notify the owner of the listed patent
upon the filing of such certification.2 17 Thereafter, the patent holder has
forty-five days to initiate a patent infringement suit against the ANDA
applicant.21 8 If the patent holder does not commence an action within
forty-five days, the FDA may approve the ANDA at any time, subject to
the fulfillment of the other requirements.2 19 If the lawsuit is filed in a
timely manner, the FDA cannot approve the ANDA for at least thirty
months.2 2 ° Moreover, the court hearing the patent case may extend the
30-month stay if either party fails to "reasonably cooperate in expediting
the action."'22 ' However, if the court presiding over the infringement
action determines before the 30-month period expires that the patent at
issue is invalid or not infringed, approval is effective from the date the
222
court decision is made.
215. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(A)(4)
(2004).
216. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2000)
217. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2000).
218. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
219. Id.
220. Id. There are, however, limited exceptions under which the 30-month period can be
altered by the court. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(IV) (2000).
221. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Ciprofloxacin I").
It seems relatively clear... that if there is no resolution of the patent litigation and a
stay is not granted, and the patent holder has not obtained preliminary injunctive
relief, the ANDA filer may begin to market its product. In such an instance, the
ANDA filer assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the pioneer

manufacturer's patent.
Id.
222. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(1) (2000).
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180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD

Although a Paragraph IV Certification is potentially dangerous for
a generic manufacturer because it places the manufacturer at risk for a
patent infringement lawsuit, it does carry some advantages. The HatchWaxman Amendments provide that the first company to submit an
ANDA IV is awarded a 180-day period of exclusive rights to market the
generic formula of the pioneer drug. 2 3 Prior to the expiration of the
exclusivity period, the FDA cannot approve any other ANDA for the
same generic drug.2 24 The exclusivity period is triggered by either the
commercial marketing of the generic drug by the first ANDA filer or the
decision of a court finding the pioneer drug's patent to be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, whichever is sooner.22 5
B.

Anti-competitive Practices in the Drug Industry

Paragraph IV Certification has prompted some in the pharmaceutical industry to employ a number of anti-competitive practices that are
currently the subject of private litigation, FTC investigations, and legislative proposals aimed at ensuring fair competition.
One of these abusive practices is the use of collusive agreements
between brand-name manufacturers and generic manufacturers, which
are aimed at keeping the first generic off the market, thus blocking all
subsequent generics from getting to the market. This arises because, as
discussed, the first ANDA filer with a Paragraph IV Certification
receives 180 days of exclusivity and sometimes controls the timing of
the drugs introduced into the market.2 26 An agreement between the first
ANDA filer and a brand-name drug manufacturer "can effectively prevent generic competition for the brand-name drug for an indefinite
223. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The 180-days of exclusivity means that "[n]o other generics
can go to market until 180 days after the first generic goes to market or wins the patent lawsuit."
FAuLIs USA, GErrING ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS: A TIMELINE (2002), available at http:l/

www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/genericstimeline.pdf?doclD=245; see also David A. Balto,
PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOoD & DRUG L.J. 321, 331 (2000)
("[T]he first generic firm to challenge a patent holder is the only generic firm that can enter; until
it enters, no other generic firm can enter the market.").
224. See Balto, supra note 223, at 331.
225. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c) (2004); see also Balto, supra note 223, at 331.
226. See 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 Fed.
Reg. 42,873 (proposed Aug. 6, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. ch. 1,subch. D, pt. 314).
During litigation of the many cases related to 180-day exclusivity, the parties and
courts have recognized the potential for the 180-day exclusivity process to
substantially delay the entry of competitive generic drug products into the market.
This situation can occur when the marketing of any subsequent generic drug product
is contingent upon the occurrence of an event that is within the first ANDA
applicant's control.
Id. at 42,874.
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period." '2 7 In exchange for agreeing not to enter the market, the first
ANDA filer is given a cut of the profits by the brand-name manufacturer, which enjoys a continued monopoly. 228 In one case, a brand-name
drug company reportedly paid $4.5 million a month to a generic manufacturer so that it would not market its generic.22 9 In another case, an
agreement was made for payments of up to $10 million per quarter.23 °
Another form of abuse is improper Orange Book listings, which
provide the opportunity for frivolous lawsuits by brand-name manufacturers who thereby trigger the 30-month stay. Because the filing of a
patent infringement lawsuit within forty-five days of notice of a Paragraph IV Certification results in an automatic delay of the FDA approval
of the generic, brand-name manufacturers have an incentive to claim,
obtain, and list as many patents as possible in the Orange Book (a practice known as "warehousing" of patents). This puts brand-name companies in a position to bring as many lawsuits as possible against a
Paragraph IV filer. This is possible because "[e]ven a completely frivolous patent infringement action will preclude FDA approval for up to 30
months." 2 3 ' Moreover, invalid patents can also form the basis for the
30-month stays.
Overall, by illegally manipulating the patent process and the FDA
approval process to delay generic marketing, brand-name companies sometimes in collusion with generic companies - accumulate millions in
additional sales. 2 The ultimate victims in the patent game are consumers who are denied access to cheaper drugs. 3
1.

COLLUSIVE AGREEMENTS

Allegations that some brand-name companies have paid or have
attempted to pay generic companies not to enter and compete are wide227.

FAMILIES

USA,

PUB.

No. 02-101,

COLLUSION AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES:

A SURVEY OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST DRUG MANUFACTURERS 5 (2002) [hereinafter
FAMILIES USA, COLLUSION], available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/classaction%
20survey.pdf?doclD=247.
228. Id.
229. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 1340, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
230. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
231. FAMILIES USA, COLLUSION, supra note 227, at 5.
232. FAMILIES USA, THE DRUG INDUSTRY, supra note 203 (observing that for one drug alone,
the brand-name manufacturer accumulated at least $160 million in additional sales by delaying
generic market entry from November 2000 to March 2001).
233. See id. ("Delaying the introduction of generic competition can protect drug company
profits, but it costs consumers millions."). Studies show that consumers save considerably when
they exercise their option by buying cheaper generics. Families USA rightly notes that "[t]he first
generic on the market is typically priced 20 to 30 percent below the comparable brand-name drug,
but as more generics enter the market, consumers have more choices, and generic prices drop
further." Id.
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spread. In reaching these agreements, the companies essentially use the
generic company's 180-day exclusivity rights to block other generic
competitors from entering the market.2 34 The FTC has found that frequently a brand-name drug manufacturer and the first generic company
to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV Certification pertaining to a
brand-name drug both have economic incentives to collude to delay
generic entry.
By blocking entry, the brand-name manufacturer may preserve
monopoly profits. A portion of these profits, in turn, can be used to
fund payments to the generic manufacturer to induce it to forgo the
profits it could have realized by selling its product. Furthermore, by
delaying the first generic's entry - and with it, the triggering of the
firms
180 days of exclusivity - the brand-name and first-filing generic
235
can sometimes forestall the entry of other generic products.

Since 2000, the FTC has settled at least three cases against brandname companies and generic companies by consent orders.2 36 In this
section, I take a look at on-going private litigation as well as FTC
enforcement actions against some companies.
a)

Private Litigation: In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation ("CIPRO III")237 (Purchasers vs. Patentee)

In the Cipro litigation, purchasers of the antibiotic ciprofloxacin
238
hydrochloride ("Cipro") aligned with advocacy groups sued Bayer,
the brand-name manufacturer of Cipro, 23 9 and four prospective generic
234. See PreparedStatement of the FTC 2003, supra note 198, § III.A.

235. Id.
236. See In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000) (decision
and order for Abbott Labs.); In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3946, 2000 WL 681849 (F.T.C. May 22,
2000) (decision and order for Geneva Pharms., Inc.); In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No.
9293, 2001 WL 502087 (F.T.C. May 8, 2001) (decision and order). The complaint for In re
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. can be found at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoech
standrxcomplaint.htm.
237. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
[hereinafter CIPRO lI]. The March 31, 2005, decision of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York builds on the court's earlier decisions in CIPRO I and CIPRO II.
CIPRO I and II provide some of the statutory and regulatory background to the present case. An
understanding of the prior history of this case is therefore important. See In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter CIPRO II]; In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter
CIPRO I]. In CIPRO I, the district court granted plaintiffs motion to remand the case to state
court. In CIPRO II, the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints were granted in part and
denied in part and the court also denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
238. "Bayer" corresponds to "Bayer AG, a German company, and its American subsidiary,
Bayer Corporation." CIPRO II, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
239. Cipro belongs in the antibiotic group known as quinolones. Cipro is used to treat a wide
range of problems including sinusitis, lower respiratory infections, urinary tract infections, and
bone, joint, skin infections. As the leading antibiotic used to treat anthrax, Cipro gained
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manufacturers: Barr, Rugby, HMR, and Watson ("Generic Defendants"). 240 The plaintiffs asserted that Bayer and the Generic Defendants
entered into an illegal agreement in which the Generic Defendants
agreed to defer entry into the market until the expiration of Bayer's
Cipro patent in return for payments from Bayer. Plaintiffs maintained
that this arrangement violated federal and state antitrust laws and moved
for partial summary judgment on the basis that it was a per se illegal
market allocation in violation of the Sherman Act's section one prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade. 2 4 ' Bayer and the Generic Defendpartial
ants (collectively "defendants") countered the motion for
24 2

summary judgment with a 12(b)(6) cross-motion to

dismiss.

Bayer manufactures and distributes Cipro and, at the time of the
litigation, was the assignee of the patent for the active ingredient in
Cipro. 4 3 The Cipro patent (Patent No. 4,670,444 - the "'444 Patent")
was issued on June 2, 1987. 44 In October 1987, Cipro obtained FDA
approval for the United States market.24 5 In October 1991, "Barr filed
ANDA 74-124 for a generic, bioequivalent version of Cipro. 24 6 Barr's
ANDA "included a Paragraph IV Certification seeking the FDA's permission to market its generic drug before the 444 Patent expire[d] on the
grounds that [Bayer's] patent [was] invalid and unenforceable. 24 7 On
December 6, 1991, pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, "Barr
popularity after the September 1I th terrorist attacks. According to Consumer Catalyst, Inc.,
"Cipro is approved for treating seventeen different infections" and "is dispensed in tablet, liquid
and intravenous forms."
See Consumer Catalyst, Cipro, available at http://www.
communitycatalyst.org/index.php?doc id=583 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005); see also CIPRO II, 261
F. Supp. 2d at 194 (observing that "Cipro has been the best selling antibiotic in the United States
for many consecutive years and is described as 'the most prescribed antibiotic in the world' ").
240. The full names of the Generic Defendants are as follows: Barr Laboratories, Inc. ("Barr");
The Rugby Group, Inc. ("Rugby"); Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. ("HMR"); and Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Watson"). CIPRO II, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
241. Id. at 191-92. The court found that the injury requirement for a Sherman Act restraint of
trade claim was not satisfied by plaintiffs claim that consumers paid inflated prices because Barr
would have prevailed in its patent case against Bayer regarding the Cipro patent and thus brought
to market (along with other generic manufacturers) a cheaper generic version. Id. at 199-202.
The court found that this causation, based on the outcome of a specific case, was "too speculative
and [was] insufficient to state a claim under the antitrust laws." Id. at 201. Plaintiffs' moved,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for partial summary judgment finding that these
agreements were per se unlawful under section one of the Sherman Act, and various state antitrust
and consumer protection laws. Id. at 230-32.
242. The cross-motion directly addressed the Sherman Act violation and alleged that the
plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead the facts. Id. at 192.
243. Id. at 194.
244. The '444 Patent expired on December 9, 2003. Id.
245. FDA approval was granted to Miles, Inc., "the predecessor to Bayer Corporation and the
licensee of the 444 Patent." Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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notified Bayer of its ANDA IV filing and its assertions contained therein
regarding Bayer's 444 Patent." '4 8 "On January 16, 1992, Bayer commenced a timely patent infringement suit against Barr 4 9 . . . thereby
triggering the 30-month statutory waiting period for FDA approval. 25 °
"Subsequently, in November 1992, Bayer and Barr executed a stipulation," approved by the judge on December 8, 1992, "whereby the parties
agreed to extend the 30-month waiting period until final judgment was
entered in the patent infringement action."'251 Without the agreement,
the stay would have expired on April 22, 1995.252
During the pendancy of the patent litigation, on January 4, 1995,
"the FDA granted tentative approval of Barr's ANDA for generic
Cipro. ' ' 2 3 In March 1996, HMR and Rugby got into the action, striking
a deal with Barr to help finance the patent litigation in exchange for a
share of the rights and profits from the eventual Cipro marketing. 4
Weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, Bayer and Barr settled the
patent litigation.2 5 5 "In connection with the settlement, on January 8,
1997, Bayer entered into three separate but interrelated settlement agreements with Barr, HMR and Rugby," and two other companies (the "Settlement Agreements"),2 56 as well as a supply agreement with Barr and
HMR (the "Supply Agreement").25 7 It is the terms of the Settlement
Agreements that ultimately gave rise to plaintiff's claims of Sherman
Act violations. 8
Under the Settlement Agreements, Bayer agreed to pay $49.1 million to Barr, HMR, Rugby, and the two other companies. In return, Barr
"agreed to amend its ANDA to change its Paragraph IV Certification to
a Paragraph III Certification. 2 5 9 A Paragraph III Certification allows
Barr "to market generic Cipro only upon expiration of the 444 Patent." 260 Per the agreement, Bayer promptly paid $49.1 million into a
248. Id.
249. Bayer AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
250. CIPRO II, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
251. Id. at 194-95.
252. Id. at 195.
253. id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. The two other companies were Bernard Sherman and Apotex, Inc. Id.
257. Id at 195-96.
258. Id. at 196 ("The terms of these agreements form the bases of plaintiffs' allegations of a
Sherman Act violation.").
259. Id.
260. Id. Under the Settlement Agreement, Barr preserved the option to re-amend to a
Paragraph IV Certification if the '444 Patent was subsequently "declared invalid or unenforceable
by a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 235 n.51 (quoting the Settlement Agreement).
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joint escrow account set up by Barr and HMR.26 '
"In the Supply Agreement, Barr and HMR agreed not to manufacture (or to have manufactured) [a generic form of] Cipro in the United
States. 26 2 According to the Agreement, Barr and HMR agreed to distribute in the United States only Bayer-manufactured Cipro or, in the
alternative, receive quarterly payments, varying from $15 million to
approximately $17 million from Bayer until the expiration of the '444
Patent in December 2003.263 Rather than supply Bayer-manufactured
Cipro as stipulated in the Supply Agreement, Bayer opted to make the
quarterly payments. Altogether, in addition to the initial payment of
$49.1 million by December 2003, Bayer had made a total payment of
approximately $398 million. 264 Finally, by virtue of a consent judgment
between Bayer and Barr the litigation was terminated. Barr affirmed the
validity of the '444 Patent and admitted infringement. However, the
26 5
consent judgment did not mention any payments from Bayer to Barr.
In CIPRO III, decided on March 31, 2005,266 plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment arguing that the Settlement Agreements violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act under a rule of reason analysis.2 67
According to the plaintiff, the Settlement Agreements met the "anticompetitive conduct" requirement stipulated in section one of the Sherman Act. 268 Bayer and Generic Defendants also moved for summary
261. Id. at 196.
262. Id.
263. Id. (observing that the agreement was that Bayer would either "(1) supply Bayermanufactured Cipro to Barr, HMR and Rugby for distribution in the United States, subject to
certain price controls; or (2) make quarterly payments - varying from $15 million to
approximately $17 million - to the Barr Escrow Account from January 1998 through December
2003") (citations omitted).
264. Id.
265. Id. ("There was no mention in the Consent Judgment of the payments Bayer agreed to
make to the Barr Escrow Account or the agreement by Barr, HMR and Rugby not to manufacture
and market a generic form of Cipro.").
266. CIPRO II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
267. The district court adopted a rule of reason analysis because, in CIPRO II, it previously
found that the Settlement Agreements and Supply Agreement did not warrant per se
condemnation under section one of the Sherman Act which, according to the court, is "reserved
for the most blatant antitrust violations." CIPRO II, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 257. According to the
court:
While an unfortunate aspect of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is that pioneer and
generic drug manufacturers have often been entering into mutually beneficial
agreements that result in delayed entry of generic drugs into the market place, the
cases that have found such agreements per se illegal involve findings that the
agreements at issue restrained noninfringing products, delayed generic entry and
perpetuated litigation. Such is not the case here.
Id.
268. Section one of the Sherman Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
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judgment arguing that because the Agreements were "within the scope
of the '444 Patent," there were "no anti-competitive effects that [were]
actionable under the Sherman Act.269 The case inevitably required the
court to examine the intersection between patent and antitrust laws.27 °
The court began by reiterating the three-step approach to the rule of
reason analysis:
The rule of reason analysis involves a three-step process. First, the
plaintiff must prove that "the challenged action has had an actual
adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market."
Next, "the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the 'pro-competitive redeeming virtues' of the action." If the defendant succeeds,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to "show that the same procompetitive effect could be achieved through an alternative means
that is less restrictive of competition. "271
After a long, detailed analysis, the court held that plaintiffs failed to
prove the first element, which was to show that the challenged action
(the Agreements) had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole
in the relevant market.27 2 The court did not go on to look at the second
and third steps in the rule of reason analysis.27 3 While the court agreed
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
269. CIPRO II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
270. Id. ("Resolution of this issue requires a close look at the intersection of patent and
antitrust laws.").
271. Id. (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
272. Id. at 541. In antitrust inquiries, the starting point usually is to define the relevant market.
Id. at 521. The goal of this important inquiry is to determine whether defendants possess the
ability to lessen or destroy competition, that is, whether the defendants possess market power. Id.
The relevant power analysis may be side-stepped if a plaintiff can "show by direct evidence 'an
actual adverse effect on competition.'" Id. (quoting Geneva v. Barr, 386 F.3d 485, 509 (2d Cir.
2004)). The court held that:
[g]iven Bayer's obvious ability to control prices, and its admission that it did not
anticipate a commensurate drop in its own production costs for Cipro, it [was]
reasonable to accept plaintiffs' contention and conclude both that the relevant
market is for ciprofloxacin and that Bayer had market power within that market.
Id. at 523
273. id. at 541.
Because plaintiffs have not shown that the Agreements had anti-competitive effects
beyond the scope of the '4.44 Patent, it is not necessary to address the second and
third steps of the rule-of-reason analysis - whether defendants can establish the
"pro-competitive redeeming virtues" of the Agreements, and whether plaintiffs can
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that the Agreements restrained competition, the court did not believe
that restraint on competition was beyond the scope allowed by patent
law. 27 4 According to the court:
Here, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate anti-competitive effects in
the market for ciprofloxacin because, although the Agreements
undoubtedly restrained competition, they did not do so beyond the
scope of the claims of the '444 Patent. The '444 Patent allows a zone
of exclusion within the bounds of its claims, and that zone is undininished by any potential invalidity of the claims. This result is
compelled by the presumption of validity Congress accorded patents
and the destabilizing effect on patent law that a contrary decision
would work. Any readjustment of the competing interests affected
by exclusion payments is a matter better addressed by Congress than
the courts.275
What about the potential harmful effect of patent monopoly on the
price of drugs and the ultimate consumers? 27 6 In the opinion of the
court, the ability to charge supracompetitive prices is a legitimate reward
of the patent monopoly and is at the core of the patentee's rights. 27 7 The
court was also unmoved by the amount of money ($398 million)
involved in the Settlement Agreements, holding only that "[tihe fact that
Bayer paid what in absolute numbers is a handsome sum to Barr to settle
its lawsuit does not necessarily reflect a lack of confidence in the '444
Patent, but rather the economic realities of what was at risk."278 Are
parties to a settlement agreement required to preserve the public's inter"show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative
means that is less restrictive of competition."
Id. (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., 61 F.3d at 127).
274. Id. at 541. Coming to the question of the effect of the Agreements on competition, the
court thought that the ultimate question and "the crux of the matter" was not whether Bayer and
Barr "had the power to adversely affect competition for ciprofloxacin as a whole," but "whether
any adverse effects on competition stemming from the Agreements were outside the exclusionary
zone of the '444 Patent." Id. at 523. In other words, the court took as its starting point the fact
that patents by their nature had adverse effect on competition. According to the court, "[i]t goes
without saying that patents have adverse effects on competition." Id.
275. Id. at 548.
276. In the instant case, "[pllaintiffs complained that they have been doubly harmed by the
Agreements: first by the exclusion of Barr from the market, and second by Bayer's passing on the
cost of the settlement payment in the form of increased prices for Cipro." Id. at 540.
277. Id. ("However, if the Agreements themselves do not exceed the exclusionary power of the
'444 Patent, any increased prices resulting from the Agreements are the result of the monopoly
inherent in the patent.") (emphasis added). The court cited with approval United States v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which asserted that "an exclusion of
competitors and charging of supracompetitive prices are at the core of the patentee's rights, and
are legitimate rewards of the patent monopoly." Id. at 1128 (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S.
29, 33 (1964) (dictum)).
278. CIPRO III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41.
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The court

responded in the negative. According to the court, "[s]uch a rule would
only result in parties being less likely to reach settlements, aside from
undermining well-settled principles of patent law."28 0 The fact that the

'444 Patent was the subject of a successful re-examination by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office undoubtedly weighed strongly in the mind
of the court.
The CIPRO III decision raises some disturbing issues. Because the
court found that the '444 Patent "gave Bayer the right to exclude compe-

tition entirely for ciprofloxacin for the term of the patent," it ultimately
concluded that "any conduct within the scope of the patent [was] exempt

from antitrust scrutiny."'281 The lesson learned is that given that patents
by their nature have adverse effect on competition,28 2 in crafting legislation, lawmakers must be extra careful to avoid leaving loop-holes that
may be further explored by patent holders. Another lesson learned is
that there are limitations in antitrust laws and that antitrust laws cannot
be used to go after every type of anti-competitive practice.2 83 The Cipro
court did not adequately address the injustice that-collusive agreements
between brand-name companies and generic manufacturers may impose
upon consumers, preferring to defer to Congress on the subject. As the
leading antibiotic used to treat anthrax, the Cipro litigation created
implications for national security, which is important, especially in these
279. Id. at 541.
280. Id. (noting that "to even attempt to quantify the public's interest in a patent settlement
between private parties would require devaluing patents across the board, a result that would
contravene the presumption of validity afforded by Congress and impact the very way patent
licenses are handled in countless daily transactions").
281. Id. at 524.
282. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945)
(noting that "a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market"); see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402
F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2005) ("By their nature, patents create an environment of
exclusion, and consequently, cripple competition. The anticompetitive effect is already present.").
283. Id. at 524 (observing that "any adverse effects within the scope of a patent cannot be
redressed by antitrust law"). The court also considered the question of "whether and to what
extent the validity of the patent should be a factor in appraising the legality of an exclusion
payment, and what sort of inquiry into validity an antitrust court should make." Id. In
approaching the question, the court carried out a detailed examination of prior decisions by two
federal circuits, two district courts and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") on the subject.
Ultimately, the court declined to engage in a post hoc assessment of the validity of the
ciprofloxacin patent, concluding, based on cases examined, that courts "have generally agreed that
an antitrust court need not make an independent assessment of the underlying patent's validity."
Id. According to the court, "making the legality of a patent settlement agreement.., contingent
on a later court's assessment of the patent's validity might chill patent settlements altogether." Id.
at 529. The court also thought that such an approach "would undermine the presumption of
validity of patents in all cases, as it could not logically be limited to drug patents, and would work
a revolution in patent law." Id.
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troubling times when threats of international and domestic terrorism
abound.28 4
b)

2 85
FTC Enforcement Action: Abbott/Geneva

Abbott/Geneva, a leading case settled by consent order, involved an
agreement between Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott") 286 and Geneva Pharmaceutical, Inc. ("Geneva") 287 (collectively "Abbott/Geneva") relating
284. The argument put forth by public interest organizations is that assuming terrorists have
access to strains of anthrax that are resistant to other readily available antibiotics and have the
capacity to deliver anthrax to large numbers of people, public health could be seriously
jeopardized if access to generic versions of Cipro is blocked and Bayer is unable to deliver large
quantities of the drugs as they are needed by governments and the public. For example, see James
Love, Talking points on Cipro patent dispute, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/
talkingpoints.html (Oct. 24, 2001). For interesting discussions on the intersection of patent law
and terrorism especially as they relate to Cipro, see James Thuo Gathii, Balancing Patent Rights
and Affordability of Prescription Drugs in Addressing Bio-Terrorism: An Analysis of In re
Cirpofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 651 (2003); Grace K.
Avedissian, Note and Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward
Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism", 18 Am. U.
INT'L L. REV. 237 (2002); Daniel Goldberg, Cornering the Market in a Post-9111 World: The
Future of Horizontal Restraints, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 557 (2003); Robert Shapiro, Patent
Infringement During a Time of National Emergency: Are Canadian, American and Mexican
Governments Permitted to Do so Under Their Domestic Law, NAFTA and TRIPS; If so, at What
Cost? 18 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & Soc. IssuEs 37 (2004).
285. In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000) (decision and
order for Abbott Labs.); In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3946, 2000 WL 681849 (F.T.C.) (May 22,
2000) (decision and order for Geneva Pharms.). The complaints against Abbott Labs. and Geneva
Pharms. are identical, and a copy of the complaint can be found in both decisions/orders. In
addition, the orders are materially the same in substance and structure. Thus, further citations,
unless otherwise indicated, will be only to the decision/order for Abbott Labs. The complaints
may also be found on the Federal Trade Commission's website: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/
c3945complaint.htm (Abbott complaint); http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946complaint.htm
(Geneva complaint). Each order may also be found on the Federal Trade Commission's website:
(Abbott order); http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000105/
http:/lwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945.do.htm
c3946.do.htm (Geneva order).
286. According to its website, Abbott Laboratories was founded by Dr. Wallace C. Abbott
over one hundred years ago and is considered today one of the world's top health care companies;
became a public company in 1929, with its financial performance ranking among the best in the
world since then; achieved $19.7 billion in worldwide sales in 1993; and has been named one of
"America's Most Admired Companies" every year since 1984 by FORTUNE Magazine. Abbott
Labs., News and Media Center, Company Fact Sheet, at http://www.abbott.com/news/facts/
corp.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
287. As of December 1, 2003, Geneva Pharmaceuticals changed its name to Sandoz. See
Media Release, Sandoz, Inc., Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Renamed Sandoz, Inc. (Dec. 1,
Geneva
2003), http://www.us.sandoz.com/site/en/company/news/pool/sandoz-name-launch.pdf.
Pharmaceuticals, one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in the U.S., was a Novartis
Company. Sandoz, a pharmaceutical company established in Switzerland in 1886, merged in
1996 with Ciba Geigy, forming Novartis Generics. The Sandoz, Inc. name change took place "to
unite its [Novartis'] generics operations." Id.
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to Hytrin78 8 Abbott's pioneer brand-name drug.2 89 The FTC complaint
alleged that Abbott paid Geneva approximately $4.5 million per month
to delay the entry of its generic Hytrin product. 290 According to the FTC
complaint, Abbott's initial patent encompassing terazosin HCL expired
in 1994 or thereabouts.2 9 ' Between 1993 and 1995, Geneva filed
ANDAs for tablet and capsule forms of generic terazosin HCL 292 and
was the first company to file an ANDA for each form.2 93 Surprisingly,
in early 1996, Abbott notified the FDA of a new Hytrin patent ('207
patent), which the FDA listed in the Orange Book. 9 4 In April 1996,
Geneva filed a Paragraph IV Certification with the FDA and duly notified Abbott of the Paragraph IV certification. 9 5 On June 4, 1996,
Abbott promptly sued Geneva, claiming patent infringement by
Geneva's terazosin HCL tablet product.2 9 6 By filing the lawsuit within
the requisite forty-five day period, Abbott's lawsuit triggered a 30month stay of final FDA approval of Geneva's tablet ANDA, lasting
until December 1998.297 However, as the first company to submit a Paragraph IV Certification for generic terazosin HCL, Geneva was also
entitled to the 180-day period of exclusivity set forth in the Hatch-Wax298
man Act.
The FTC complaint centered around an April 1, 1998, agreement
between Abbott and Geneva. According to this agreement, Geneva
agreed not to enter the market with either the generic terazosin HCL
capsule or tablet product until the earlier of: "(1) the final resolution of
the patent infringement litigation involving Geneva's terazosin HCL tablets product, including review through the Supreme Court; or (2) entry
288. Hytrin contains terazosin HCL, which is used principally to treat benign enlarged prostate
and hypertension. See Complaint, In re Abbott Labs, No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848, para. 10-11
(F.T.C. May 22, 2000).
289. See id. Hytrin was introduced in 1987 and was the only terazosin HCL product sold in
the U.S. until mid-1999, when Geneva finally introduced its generic version. Id. para. 11. By
2000, total U.S. sales of terazosin HCL amounted to approximately $540 million per year. Id.
para. 10.
290. Id. paras. 26-27.
291. Id. para. 15.
292. Geneva filed its ANDA for a tablet form of generic terazosin HCL around January 1993
and its ANDA for a capsule form around December 1995. Id. para. 16.
293. Id.
294. Id. para. 17.
295. Id. By filing a Paragraph IV certification, Geneva was essentially claiming that its
generic terazosin HCL products did not infringe any of Abbott's patents, including Abbott's
newly listed '207 patent. Id.
296. Id. para. 18. It is significant that even though Geneva's capsule and tablet involved the
same potential infringement issues, Abbott made no infringement claim against Geneva's capsule
product. See id.
297. id. para. 19.
298. See id. para. 23.
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of another generic terazosin HCL product. '2 99 At Abbott's insistence,
Geneva also agreed not to transfer, assign, or otherwise relinquish its
right to the 180-day period of exclusivity.3 °° In return, "Abbott agreed
to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month in non-refundable payments until
30 1
a district court judgment in the parties' patent infringement dispute."
Why did Geneva enter such an agreement? To Geneva, the agreement
represented the "'best of all worlds,' because [the company] obtained a
risk-free 'monetary settlement on an ongoing basis until the litigation
was resolved' and still could market its product exclusively for 180 days

after the litigation was over. "302
As a result of the agreement, Geneva began receiving monthly payments of $4.5 million from Abbott and refrained from entering the market with its generic terazosin HCL capsules, which was not under
litigation.30 3 Geneva also refrained from entering the market with its
generic terazosin HCL capsules even after September 1998, when a U.S.
district court granted its motion for summary judgment in its patent tablet litigation with Abbott and invalidated Abbott's patent. 3° However,
under the terms of its agreement with Abbott, "Geneva still could not
enter the generic terazosin HCL market until after the Supreme Court
either denied Abbott's petition for certiorari or disposed of the patent
infringement litigation. 30 5 In August 1999, Abbott and Geneva canceled their agreement, perhaps as a result of the FTC investigation, and
Geneva finally introduced its generic terazosin HCL capsule product

into the marketplace on August 13,

1999.306

The FTC complaint alleged that the Abbot/Geneva agreement
"acted with the specific intent that Abbott monopolize the relevant market, and engaged in overt acts . . . in furtherance of a conspiracy to
monopolize the relevant market, in violation of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act."30 7 According to the FTC, the acts and practices
of Abbott and Geneva "had the purpose or effect, or the tendency or
299. Id. para. 26.
300. Id. para. 26.
301. Id. para. 27. Abbott and Geneva also agreed that "if the district court declared that
Geneva's tablet product did not or would not infringe any valid and enforceable claim of the '207
patent, Abbott would thereafter pay the $4.5 million monthly payments into an escrow fund until
the final resolution of the litigation." Id. The understanding was that the money in the escrow
fund would be ceded to the prevailing party. Id.
302. Id. para. 29.
303. See id. para. 30.
304. Id. para. 31.
305. Id. para. 33. On July 1, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Geneva. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on
January 10, 2000. Id.
306. Id. para. 33.
307. Id. para. 41.
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capacity, to restrain competition unreasonably and to injure competition
by preventing or discouraging the entry of competition in the form of
generic versions of Hytrin into the relevant market. 3 °8
The case was resolved by consent order 30 9 The orders prohibited
Abbott and Geneva from entering into NDA/ANDA (brand/generic)
Agreements in which: (1) the ANDA First Filer (generic) producer is
prohibited from relinquishing its 180-day marketing exclusivity rights,
or (2) the ANDA First Filer (generic) producer agrees to refrain from
developing any drug product that has potential for FDA approval and
that is not the subject of a patent infringement court action. 3 '0 The companies were also required to obtain court approval for any agreements
made in the context of an interim settlement of a patent infringement
action that provided for payments to the ANDA First Filer (generic) in
order to stay off the market, with advance notice to the Commission to
allow it time to present its views to the court.31 Finally, the companies
were ordered to give advance notice to the Commission before reaching
a similar agreement in non-litigation contexts.31 2

2.

IMPROPER EXTENSION OF MONOPOLY

Brand-name manufacturers in the U.S. also delay generic competition through the use of improper Orange Book listing, which typically
triggers the 30-month exclusivity period under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Improper monopoly extension achieved through the improper Orange
Book listing strategy typically "involves abuse of the Hatch-Waxman
process itself to restrain trade. 3 13 Indeed, the FTC has found that sometimes brand-name drug manufacturers "act strategically to obtain more
than one 30-month stay of FDA approval of a particular generic
drug."314
Improper Orange Book listing could be characterized as a fraud on
consumers and the FDA because oftentimes brand-name companies,
motivated solely by the desire to delay generic entry, falsely and knowingly list invalid patents. The problem arises because of a loophole in
308. Id.para. 34.
309. See supra note 285. The consent order in Abbott Laboratoriesis available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2000/ 03/abbott.do.htm. The consent order in Geneva Pharmaceuticalsis available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/geneva d&o.htm.
310. Order, In re Abbott Labs, No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000), § II.
311. Id.§ III.
312. Id.§ IV.
313. Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission on Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,107th Cong. § III.B. 1 (Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter PreparedStatement of the FTC
2002], available at http://www.ftc.gov/02/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm.
314. PreparedStatement of the FTC 2003, supra note 198, § III.B. (emphasis provided).
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the law. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, not all patents are eligible for
listing in the Orange Book and entitled to the special statutory 30-month
stay. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for listing only if two conditions
are met. First, listing is called for if the patent "claims the drug... or a
method of using such drug. 3 15 Second, listing is also called for if the
patent is one "with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner [of the
patent] engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug."3 6 The
difference between listed patents and unlisted patents is that only the
former triggers the automatic 30-month stay.3 17
Brand-name companies are increasingly exploiting loopholes in
Hatch-Waxman and the FDA approval processes to the detriment of
consumers. This arises because, despite the serious legal and competitive implications of Orange Book listings, "it is private parties, rather
than the FDA, that in practice determine whether patents are listed. 31 8
Regarding the Orange Book listing, the role of the FDA is solely ministerial. 3 19 Not only is the role of the FDA ministerial, generic applicants
have no right to bring an action to challenge an NDA holder's Orange
Book listing as improper. 32' The overall result is that the FDA's listings
do not create any presumption a patent is correct. 32' Nevertheless, as
long as a patent remains listed, a brand-name company "can continue to
benefit from the availability of an automatic 30-month stay of FDA
approval of ANDAs, by initiating a patent suit against geneic
315. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2004); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(2), 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (2004).
316. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. 355(c)(2), 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (2004).
317. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, IN THE MATrER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY:
ANALYSIS TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT (noting that "[i]n the case of patents not eligible for listing in
the Orange Book, a branded firm still can sue a generic company for patent infringement, but
under ordinary federal litigation procedures and without the benefit of an automatic 30-month
stay") [hereinafter IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersanalysis.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). In the case of
unlisted patents, to prevent the sale of the generic product before conclusion of a law suit, "a
branded firm must obtain a preliminary injunction, which requires that it demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits, among other factors." Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
The FDA has repeatedly stated that its role in patent listings is solely ministerial and
that it lacks the resources and expertise to scrutinize patent information in the
Orange Book. Even when a generic applicant disputes a patent listing, the FDA
merely asks the NDA holder to confirm that the listed patent information is correct.
Unless the NDA holder-itself withdraws or amends its listed patent information, the
FDA will not remove the patent listings from the Orange Book.
Id.(citing Am. Biosci., Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
320. See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1329-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
321. See Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (D.N.J.
1998) (stating that "the FDA's listing should not create any presumption that [a] patent was
correctly listed").
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applicants. 3 22
Because the FDA accepts the Orange Book listing at face value,
brand-name companies can defraud the system through improper listing. 32 3 The net result is that "brand-name companies are increasingly
listing in the Orange Book, and suing on, multiple patents, and that these
are frequently patents that have been listed after an ANDA has been
filed. '324 In some cases, for example where the patent is obtained and
listed after the generic applicant has filed its ANDA, multiple 30-month
stays were possible.32 5 In these cases, the FTC found that the delay of
FDA approval beyond the first thirty months ranged from four to forty
months.3 26
a)

Private Litigation: In re Buspirone Patent Litigation3 27

(Generic Company vs. Patentee)
In this case, competitors filed antitrust claims against Bristol-Myers

Squibb Company ("BMS")3 28 alleging that the company engaged in
anti-competitive conduct by improperly extending its monopoly over
buspirone hydrochloride ("buspirone"), an anti-anxiety drug sold under
the brand-name BuSpar. On February 14, 2002, District Judge John G.
Koeltl granted in part and denied in part Bristol-Myers's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' antitrust and related state law claims.
322. IN THE MATrER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIB COMPANY, supra note 317.
323. See, e.g., Am. Biosci., Inc., 269 F.3d at 1080 (observing that the FDA "has refused to
become involved in patent listing disputes, accepting at face value the accuracy of NDA holders'
patent declarations and following their listing instructions").
324. IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra note 317.
325. See id.
326. See id.

327. In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). To fully understand
this case, one must also read other related patent dispute cases, all involving disputes over the use
and sale of Buspirone. "On August 15, 2001, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated for pre-trial purposes before [the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York] four patent actions, which had been consolidated under MDL-1410, and twenty-two
antitrust actions, which had been consolidated under MDL-1413." See In re Buspirone Patent
Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (action by brand-name manufactuer, BristolMyers Squibb, against a competitor for the manufacture or sale of generic buspirone for use in
accordance with the FDA-approved labeling instructions for BuSpar®).
328. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in New York
City. In 2004 it reported $19.4 billion in global sales. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., About Us, At a
Glance, available at http://www.bms.comlaboutbms/data/ (data as reported in the Bristol-Myers
Squibb 2004 Annual Report). In 1980, BMS obtained a patent covering the use of buspirone for
the treatment of anxiety (the "'763 Patent"). Since 1986, when the FDA approvied the drug for
human use, BMS has been selling the product. In re Busipirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at
365.
Involved as the plaintiffs in the consolidated case are generic drug makers, direct purchasers
of buspirone products, end-payors, consumer protection organizations or their representatives, and
thirty states. Id. at 365-66.
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The competitors alleged that BMS, by settling a patent infringement suit with Danbury Pharmacal, Inc. ("Danbury") and its affiliate
Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Schein") in 1994, "attempted to extend
and/or extended an unlawful monopoly over [the market of] buspirone
products," and that BMS "also entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade
in [the buspirone] market" in violation of sections one and two of the
Sherman Act.3 29 The plaintiffs also alleged that BMS "attempted to
extend and/or extended an unlawful monopoly over the market in buspirone tablets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act by abusing a
number of provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.3 3 ° Plaintiffs
alleged that through fraudulently filing its '365 Patent with the FDA,
BMS caused the agency to list the patent in the Orange Book and, as a
result, blocked generic competition with its BuSpar product. Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that the FDA was precluded from approving
the generic version of buspirone once BMS listed its '365 Patent in the
Orange Book. 33 1 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that BMS made a
bad faith attempt to interfere with the generic competitors' entry into the
buspirone market by listing the '365 Patent in the Orange Book, on
November 21, 2000, less than one day before the '763 Patent expired
and by falsely and fraudulently representing to the FDA that the new
'365 Patent covered new uses of buspirone and that a reasonable claim
of patent infringement could be asserted against generic producers of the
drug.
BMS moved to dismiss all the antitrust claims, citing as one of
basis for the motion the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 332 The motion to
dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Eastern
329. In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 366. In the patent infringement suit by
BMS against Danbury and Schein, BMS "argued that Schein would infringe the '763 Patent by
manufacturing and selling generic buspirone tablets before the '763 Patent expired." Id. The case
ultimately settled with BMS paying the defendants $72.5 million. In the present case, plaintiffs
allege that the 1994 settlement by BMS "was a sham used to cover up an unlawful anticompetitive arrangement under which Schein agreed to stay out of the buspirone market and help
maintain a public perception that the '763 Patent was valid." Id.
330. Id. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments are "also known as the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act." Id.
331. See id. at 366.
332. A detailed analysis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
For literature on the subject, see Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of the NoerrPennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1984);
James S. Wrona, A Clash of Titans: The First Amendment Right To Petition vs. The Antitrust
Laws, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 637 (1994); Jeff McGoff, Note, Exploring the Boundary of the NoerrPennington Doctrine in the Adjudicative Process, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 429 (2004); Russell
Wofford, Considering the "Pattern Litigation" Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust
Defense, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 95 (2003).
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Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,3 3 3 and
United Mine Workers v. Pennington.334 Essentially, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides immunity from antitrust liability to individuals who petition the government to take actions even when the petition is
motivated by self-interest and the governmental action desired imposes
restraints on trade.33 5 In Noerr, the Supreme Court took as its starting
point the rule that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated
upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws. 3 36
The Court went on to hold that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two
or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the
legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law
that would produce a restraint or a monopoly. 3 3 7
First Amendment considerations underpin this rule.3 38 According
to the Supreme Court, to hold that the Sherman Act forbids associations
for the purpose of influencing the activity of a branch of the government
"would raise important constitutional questions" because "[t]he right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights. ' 339 The
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine extends to petitioning activity before administrative agencies and courts.3 40
There are exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington immunity. "Sham"
petitions are not immunized. 34 1 According to the Supreme Court, where
petitioning activity "ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi333. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
334. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
335. David L. Meyer, Note, A Standard for Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More
Closely to the First Amendment Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832 (1986) (observing that the Noerr-

Pennington doctrine "provides antitrust immunity for all genuine efforts to seek governmental
action, regardless of whether the petitioning produces incidental injury to competition or the
governmental action sought is legitimate and thus immune from antitrust liability").
336. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135.
337. Id. at 136.
338. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, LLP, Newsletters, U.S. Supreme Court Narrows "Sham
Exception" to Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, Aug. 1993 (observing that "[t]he First Amendment
protects the right to petition the government, even when the petition is motivated purely by selfinterest"), at http://www.rmslaw.com/newsletters/art20.htm.
339. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
340. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509, 510-11 (1972);
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman LLP, supra note 338 (noting that "Noerr-Pennington protection
extends to the filing of lawsuits for anti-competitive purposes").
341. See generally Lawrence D. Bradley, Noerr-Pennington Immunity From Antitrust Liability

Under Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.: Replacing the Sham
Exception with a Constitutional Analysis, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1305 (1984); Ann K. Wooster,
"Sham" Exception to Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, Exempting from Federal
Antitrust Laws Joint Efforts to Influence Governmental Action Based on PetitioningLegislative or
Executive Body, 177 A.L.R. FED. 371 (2002).
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tor[,] . . .the application of the Sherman Act would be justified. ' 342 A
"sham" litigation is one which is "objectively baseless in the sense that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits"34' 3
and which "conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor through the use [of] the governmental process - as opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anticompetitive weapon.
An additional exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity exists for
conduct in which a party knowingly and willfully makes false representations to the government (the fraud exception).3 45 In Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. (Walker Process),34 6 the Supreme Court held that a party that had monopolized a
market through threats of suit, and through a subsequent patent infringement suit based on a patent that the party had obtained by making fraudulent representations to the Patent Office, did not qualify for NoerrPennington immunity.34 7 The Walker Process exception can independently strip a patent holder of Noerr-Penningtonimmunity.3 4
In the instant case, BMS argued that its conduct "in listing the '365
Patent in the Orange Book and bringing its subsequent patent infringement suits against [competitors] Mylan and Watson [was] immunized
from federal antitrust liability under Noerr-Pennington standards. 3 4 9
After reiterating the Noerr-Penningtonrule and its accompanying exceptions, the district court concluded that under current Federal Circuit law,
a patent holder who seeks to enforce a patent through litigation can lose
Noerr-Penningtonimmunity in two ways:
first, if the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful
fraud within the meaning of Walker Process, and if the plaintiff in the
patent infringement suit was aware of the fraud when bringing suit;
or second, if the patent infringement suit was a mere sham . . .
342. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (emphasis added); see also Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 515
("First Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving 'substantive
evils' which the legislature has the power to control.") (citations omitted).
343. Prof'l Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60

(1993).
344. Id. at 60-61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 and Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991)).
345. See generally Daniel J. Davis, Comment, The Fraud Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 69 U. Cmi. L. REv. 325 (2002).
346. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
347. See id. at 174-78.
348. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding in a limited en banc ruling that it is a question of Federal Circuit law whether the
fraudulent procurement of a patent and its subsequent use to generate anti-competitive injuries
through suits and threats of suit are sufficient to strip a patentee of Noerr-Penningtonimmunity).
349. In re Busirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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namely that it was objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by
a desire to impose collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than to
obtain a justifiable legal remedy.350

Does the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine apply to Bristol-Myers's conduct in listing the '365 Patent in the Orange Book? According to the
district court, the answer depends on whether listing patents in the
Orange Book would be considered a petitioning activity for Noerr-Pennington purposes.3 5 ' In deciding whether a particular type of conduct is
petitioning activity for Noerr-Penningtonpurposes, the court ruled that
it was "critical to distinguish between activities in which the government
acts or renders a decision only after an independent review of the merits
of a petition and activities in which the government acts in a merely
ministerial or non-discretionary capacity in direct reliance on the representations made by private parties. ' 3 2 According to the court, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine:
is not applicable to conduct through which private parties seek to
achieve anticompetitive aims by making representations to the government in circumstances where the government does not perform
any independent review of the validity of the statements, does not

make or issue any intervening judgment and instead acts in direct
reliance on the private party's representations. 35 3

Ultimately, the district court concluded that BMS's activities in listing
the '365 Patent in the Orange Book were not acts of petitioning because
the FDA's actions in connection with the listings "[were] non-discretionary and [did] not reflect any decision as to the validity of the representations in an Orange Book listing."33 4
350. Id.

351. Id. BMS argued that the listing in the Orange Book met the requisite criteria "because it
was a request for governmental action, specifically, for the FDA to publish the information
submitted to it in the Orange Book." Id.
352. Id. at 369.
One of the reasons for extending Noerr-Pennington immunity to acts through which
private parties seek to influence governmental decisions in the first class of cases is
that these private parties can often only obtain the anticompetitive effects in
question by first convincing the government of the merits of their views and by
obtaining a valid and independent governmental decision, which intervenes between
the private parties' actions and these anticompetitive results.
Id. at 369-70.
353. Id. at 370. The court uses Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), as
an example. In Litton, "the Second Circuit held that AT&T's filing of an interface tariff with the
Federal Communications Commission .

.

. was not petitioning activity for Noerr-Pennington

purposes." In re Busirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
354. Id. at 371. The court cited as examples supporting its conclusion: American Biosci., Inc.
v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[The FDA] administers the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments in a ministerial fashion simply following the intent of the parties that list patents.");
Watson Pharms., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Md. 2001):
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The district court further held that even if the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine applied to BMS's activities, the antitrust plaintiffs, Mylan and
Watson, had "pleaded sufficient facts to warrant an exception to immunity under the reasoning set forth in Walker Process.' 355 For the district
court, the question was "whether the Walker Process exception would
apply to a fraudulent listing of a patent in the Orange Book along with
subsequent lawsuits seeking to exploit the listing for anticompetitive
advantage. 35 6 While noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has addressed the question, the
court observed that "in creating the Walker Process doctrine, the
Supreme Court explained that a claim alleging an initial fraud on the
Patent Office would avoid Noerr-Penningtonimmunity for a number of
reasons that are directly applicable to fraudulent listings in the Orange
Book. ' 357 Paramount in the mind of the court was the fact that "listing
submissions, like patent applications, are not adversarial proceedings,
subject to 8the same kind of rigorous adversarial testing as in
35
litigation.
Applying the standard set forth in ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, Inc.3 59 to the Orange Book listing and the subsequent litigations,
the court held that "there was no objective basis for Bristol-Myers to
claim that the '365 Patent claimed the use of buspirone, or that the Pat[I]t
is paramount to keep in mind that the FDA, in deciding to make an Orange
Book listing, is not acting as a patent tribunal. It has no expertise - much less any
statutory franchise - to determine matters of substantive patent law.... In making
its decision to list a patent, therefore, it is entirely appropriate and reasonable for the
FDA to rely on the patentee's declaration as to the coverage.
Id. at 445; Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2001), rev'd on
other grounds, 268 F3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the FDA's role in listing patents is
purely ministerial).
355. In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 373. The plaintiffs did not argue that the
'365 Patent was fraudulently obtained, but rather that BMS "engaged in fraud on the FDA by...
claiming that the Patent covered the approved uses of buspirone, when Bristol-Myers knew that
these statements were false." Id. The plaintiffs also contended that BMS "pursued patent
infringement suits against Mylan and Watson and obtained an automatic stay of the FDA's
approval of their products, with knowledge that the stay was obtained by making false statements
to the FDA." Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 373-74.
The FDA is required by law to perform even less independent review of the
statements made in a listing submission than the Patent Office performs in the
patent application review process, thus making the risks of abuse greater. Hence,
even if listing were petitioning, the Walker Process exception would apply to
Bristol-Myers's alleged conduct in this case.
Id. at 374.
359. Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1993).
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ent could have been valid if it did."'3 6° "The test for objective baselessness is by definition an objective one." 36 ' According to the court:
This is, moreover, not a case in which there are occasional places in
which Bristol-Myers has mischaracterized or mistaken the relevant
issues or legal standards. It is a case where Bristol-Myers has repeatedly argued for a position that requires establishing a number of
claims, each one of which has no basis, and each one of which
depends upon reframing or mischaracterizing some critical issue or
legal standard for its apparent cogency. This is also not a case in
which Bristol-Myers has been arguing for reasonable extensions or
developments of the law. Bristol-Myers has taken the straightforward position that it can, in effect, extend a monopoly and reclaim an
invention after the expiration of its patent on the invention, when "[i]t
is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created
by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered
by the patent becomes public property." The public has already paid
for its right to these uses by the grant of a limited patent monopoly to
Bristol-Myers, which has expired. Bristol-Myers's argument ignores
the law and tries to justify taking property that belongs to the
public.362

In view of the reasoned analysis above, the district court deemed it
"unnecessary to decide whether the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine applie[d]
to some or all of the related state law claims arising out [of] Bristol'
Myers's listing conduct and subsequent patent infringement suits. "363
The court also did not rule on the qualified immunity argument put forth
by BMS, 3 64 holding only that the plaintiffs' allegations that BMS's
"conduct in listing the '365 Patent in the Orange Book and bringing the
subsequent patent infringement suits against Mylan and Watson was
performed in bad faith and with knowledge that the '365 Patent does not
cover uses of buspirone" and that "[t]hese facts, if proven, would be
360. In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
The language of the claim, its specification and the prosecution history all
demonstrate beyond all reasonable dispute that the '365 Patent does not cover the
use of buspirone. Moreover, a straightforward application of governing patent law
provisions establishes that the '365 Patent would have been invalid if it did. BristolMyers's creative legal arguments to the contrary cannot breathe life into claims that
have no basis.
Id.

361. Id. at 375 ("It is not what the parties think of the merits of their position that matters; it is
whether there are, in fact, sufficient objective bases for the positions taken.").
362. Id. at 376 (citations omitted) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 152 (1989)).
363. Id.
364. Bristol-Myers argued that all of the claims arising out of the '365 Patent activities should
be dismissed because "patent owners enjoy a qualified immunity when they act in good faith to
protect their patent rights." See id.
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'
sufficient to strip Bristol-Myers of any qualified patent immunity." 365
The case is still pending.

b)

FTC Enforcement Action

i. Biovail (Tiazac)36 6 The first FTC enforcement action to attempt
to remedy the effects of an allegedly anti-competitive Orange Book listing was against Biovail Corporation ("Biovail").3 6 7 In the complaint,
the FTC charged that Biovail illegally acquired an exclusive patent
license and wrongfully listed that patent in the Orange Book for the
purpose of blocking generic competition to its branded drug Tiazac.36 8
As a result of the listing, Biovail was able to bring an infringement lawsuit against Andrx, triggering a 30-month stay of FDA final approval of
Andrx's generic Tiazac product. 369 According to the FTC complaint,
Biovail knew that the new patent did not claim the form of Tiazac that it
had been marketing, and Biovail did not need this new patent to continue marketing Tiazac without infringement risk. 37 0 The FTC further
alleged that Biovail misleadingly represented to the FDA that the new
patent claimed Tiazac existing-and-approved, rather than revised-andunapproved, to avoid de-listing from the Orange Book and termination
of the stay against Andrx. 31 According to the complaint, Biovail's patent acquisition, wrongful Orange Book listing, and misleading conduct
before the FDA were acts in unlawful maintenance of its Tiazac monopoly, in violation of section five of the FTC Act37 2 and section seven of
the Clayton Act. 373
On April 23, 2002, the FTC announced that it had accepted for
public comment an agreement and proposed consent order with Biovail
Corporation.37 4 The consent order required Biovail to divest the illegally acquired patent to its original owner, dismiss its infringement case
against Andrx (thus allowing entry of generic Tiazac), and refrain from
365. Id. at 376-77.
366. Complaint, In re Biovail Corp., No. C-4060, 2002 WL 727033 (F.T.C. Apr. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/200204Ibiovailcomplaint.htm.
367. Biovail Corporation describes itself as a "full-service pharmaceutical company, engaged
in the formulation, clinical testing, registration, manufacturing, sale and promotion of
pharmaceutical products." Biovail Corp., About Biovail, at http://www.biovail.com (last visited
Jan. 28, 2005).
368. Complaint, In re Biovail Corp., 2002 WL 727033, para. 1.
369. Id. para. 26.
370. Id. para. 36.
371. Id. paras. 42-44.
372. Id. paras. 54-57. Section 5 of the FTC Act is found at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
373. Complaint, In re Biovail Corp., 2002 WL 727033, paras. 50-53. Section 7 of the Clayton
Act is found at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
374. Order, In re Biovail Corp., No. C-4060, 2002 WL 727033 (F.T.C. Apr. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/biovaildo.pdf.
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another 30-month stay on generic
also required Biovail to give the FTC
that it intended to list in the Orange
products.3 76

ii. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 377 In an April 18, 2003
complaint, 7 8 the FTC charged that BMS engaged in a series of unlawful
acts to delay competition from generic versions of three of its major
drug products. 37 9 The FTC subsequently announced that it had accepted
for public comment an agreement and proposed consent order with
BMS, which was intended to settle the charges against the company.38 °
In its complaint, the FTC alleged that BMS abused FDA processes in
order to block generic competition to the three prescription drugs, and
that it misused the regulatory scheme established by Congress to accelerate generic drug approval. 38 ' At issue was BMS's activities relating to
three of its prescription drug products: BuSpar, an anti-anxiety agent,
and Taxol and Platinol, two anti-cancer drugs. 382 The action involving
BuSpar is discussed here.
BMS began selling BuSpar in 1986, and by 2000, BuSpar sales in
the United States were over $600 million. 38 3 The FTC complaint
alleged that in anticipation of the expiration of its '763 BuSpar Patent in
November 2000, BMS filed a new patent application with the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") in 1999, involving the use of buspirone to
create the metabolite of buspirone. 384 After repeated rejection of its patent application by the PTO,3" 5 BMS succeeded in obtaining a patent
('365 Patent) only hours before '763 BuSpar Patent was about to expire
and proceeded to submit the '365 Patent details to the FDA for listing in
the Orange Book.38 6 The complaint further alleged that BMS's '365
Patent did not meet either of the statutory requirements for listing a pat375. Id. § IV.
376. Id. § VIII.
377. In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076, (F.T.C. Apr. 18, 2003).
378. Complaint, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076 (F.T.C. Apr. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf.
379. Id. para. 1.
380. Order, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076 (F.T.C. Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf.
381. Complaint, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb, No. C-4076, para. 2.
382. Id. paras. 4-6.
383. See id. para. 4.
384. Id. para. 45. A metabolite is the new molecule created when a pharmaceutical agent
breaks down in the body.
385. See id. paras. 37-44.
386. Id. paras. 45-47. BMS was repeatedly rejected by the PTO because the company had
been making and selling BuSpar to treat anxiety in the U.S. for nearly fourteen years. Patent '365
was issued only after BMS requested "a patent that claimed solely the use of the metabolite of
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ent in the Orange Book because it "(1) [did] not claim BuSpar or a
method of using BuSpar, and (2) it is not one with respect to which a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against someone selling BuSpar. 38 7 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that "even
though [BMS] knew that the patent covered only a method of using a
metabolite, and not a method of using buspirone itself,"3'88 it nonetheless
declared to the FDA that the '365 Patent claimed a method of using
BuSpar in order to list the patent in the Orange Book.38 9 Worse, after
ANDA filers on BuSpar asserted to the FDA that the '365 Patent did not
meet the criteria for listing in the Orange Book, BMS intentionally made
an additional false and misleading statement.3 90 The FDA, without making any independent determination regarding the scope and coverage of
the '365 Patent, accepted at face value BMS's statements and, as of
November 21, 2000, deemed the '365 Patent listed in the Orange
Book. 3 91 The FTC complaint charged that BMS "knew that its representations to the FDA - to the effect that the '365 patent claimed a method
of using buspirone - were false and misleading, . . . [yet] made these
misrepresentations purposely and intentionally, to obtain wrongfully an
Orange Book listing of the '365 patent. '3 9 2 As a result of its wrongful
listing in the Orange Book, BMS "illegitimately acquired the ability to
trigger a 30-month stay, thereby delaying entry of generic buspirone,
and depriving consumers of lower prices and other benefits of competition. 39 3 It is pertinent to note that generic competition to BuSpar
occurred only after the '365 Patent was removed from the Orange Book
in March 2001 following a district court decision ordering BMS to seek
394
de-listing.
The FTC also alleged that the patent infringement suits BMS
buspirone - not the use of buspirone itself." IN THE MATTER OF BRiSTOL-MYERS
supra note 317, § B.
387. Complaint, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb, No. C-4076, para. 50.
388. Id. para. 47.

SQUIBB

COMPANY,

389. See IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra note 317, § A.

390. See Complaint, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb, No. C-4076, paras. 52-55.
The FDA asked BMS to provide a declaration that the '365 patent contains a claim
for an approved use of buspirone. BMS responded with a declaration expressly
affirming that the '365 patent does in fact claim the approved uses of buspirone, a
statement that was false and directly contradicted representations BMS made to the
PTO to obtain the '365 patent.
IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra note 317, § A,

391. Complaint, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb, No. C-4076, para. 57.
392. Id. para. 58.
393. Id.
394. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). Later that year in
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, the Federal Court reversed on jurisdictional grounds, holding
that no private right of action existed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to seek delisting. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1329-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
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brought against ANDA filers for infringement of the '365 Patent "were
objectively baseless" and filed without regard to their merits,39 5 and that
the intent and effect of BMS's suits "was to prevent generic buspirone
manufacturers from marketing their products for as long as possible,
through wrongfully triggering of the 30-month stay. 3 96 Entry of a
lower-priced generic version of BuSpar would have "significantly and
immediately decreased BMS's BuSpar sales and market share, and led
to a substantial reduction in the average price paid for buspirone products," 3 9 7 hence the motivation to game the system. The FTC thus
charged BMS with engaging in acts that willfully maintained its monopolies in buspirone in violation of section five of the FTC Act.3 98
The consent order39 9 bars BMS from seeking to list the '365 Patent
in the Orange Book in relation to any NDA in which the active ingredient is buspirone.4 0 0 The order also invokes general prohibitions
"designed to deter improper listings and to prevent BMS from triggering
the Hatch-Waxman automatic 30-month stay in circumstances that could
improperly block generic entry. 40 1 The consent order also contains a
general prohibition against making false statements to the FDA.4" 2
Regarding the allegations that BMS engaged in sham litigation, the consent order bars BMS from asserting "any fraudulent or objectively baseless claim"40 3 or from enforcing "any patent that it knows is invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed." 4°4
The Orange Book listing scheme established by the Hatch-Waxman
Act naively assumed that brand-name companies (as NDA holders)
would act in good faith in listing patents.4"5 However, there is mounting
evidence that listings are made in bad faith (to block generic competition) and are not based on a reasonable, good faith belief that the patents
395. Complaint, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb, No. C-4076, para. 59.
396. Id. para. 60.
397. Id. para. 65.
398. Id. paras. 135-39.
399. Order, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076 (F.T.C. Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf.
400. Id. § II.
401. IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra note 317. For example,
Paragraph VI bars BMS from seeking or maintaining Orange Book listings where the listing of
such patent is unlawful. Order, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076, § VI. Paragraph
VII bars BMS from taking any action to obtain or maintain a 30-month Hatch-Waxman stay on
FDA approval in certain specified situations. Id. § VII.
402. Order, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076, § VIII. The purpose was "[t]o
ensure that BMS does not seek to obstruct generic competition through false statements to the
FDA outside the Orange Book listing context, such as through the citizen petition process." IN
THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra note 317.
403. Order, In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. C-4076, § IX.A.
404. Id. § IX.B.
405. See IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, supra note 317.
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listed are listable. As the FTC has noted, "the Orange Book listing
scheme is susceptible to opportunistic behavior, 4 0 6 and brand-name
companies (as NDA holders) frequently exploit the listing scheme by
obtaining patents and listing them in order to block FDA approvals of
generic rivals when the NDA holder does not reasonably expect the patents to ultimately hold up in court.4" 7
C.

Conclusion

The goal of this section was to highlight how a law enacted in part
to stimulate generic competition, and thereby expand consumer access to
cheaper alternative life-saving drugs, has been hijacked by brand-name
drug manufacturers, sometimes in collusion with generic drug manufacturers. Brand-name drug companies have traditionally been viewed with
suspicion. However, as the case studies highlight, generic drug companies are no saints either. Given the proper incentive, some generic drug
companies may be willing to delay or disrupt competition and keep drug
prices artificially high. Collusion between the generic companies is also
possible and is increasingly the focus of FTC enforcement actions.4 08
It is disheartening that drug manufacturers can brazenly engage in
fraudulent, anti-competitive practices in a country like the United States,
a country with state-of-the-art antitrust laws, a plethora of consumer protection laws, a sound judicial system that provides avenues for those
harmed to seek recourse, and a strong public regulatory and enforcement
agency able to monitor the activities of the companies concerned, such
as the FTC. None of these mechanisms are readily available at the
global level. There is at present nothing to stop a pharmaceutical company intent on exploiting loopholes in the Doha Declaration and the
2003 Decision on Implementation from delaying generic competition.
In theory, the combined effect of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha
Declaration, and the 2003 Decision on Implementation will be that
developing countries will have more opportunities to obtain essential
406. Id.
407. See id.
408. See PreparedStatement of the FTC 2002, supra note 313, § 11I.C. The FTC has identified
two potentially competition-reducing categories of agreements that merit the agencies close
attention. The first involves exclusive distributorship arrangements, under which a second generic
entrant, "rather than bringing a competing product to market, might agree to become the exclusive
distributor of the first entrant. Such an arrangement would essentially grant the second entrant an
agreed-upon share of the market." Id. The goal is to avoid aggressive price competition by
dividing up the market. The second category involves division of market segments. Id. Under
such an arrangement, the first generic agrees to market its product exclusively in one market,
while the second entrant agrees to market exclusively in another. Id. Again, without having to
vigorously compete, the companies can make greater profits in their respective markets. See id.

2005]

PATENT WARS IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

275

pharmaceutical products at reduced prices.4 0 9 However, an examination
of the nature and intensity of competition in the pharmaceutical sector in
the U.S. suggests that abuse of patent rights is rife throughout the industry and that in many instances, brand-name pharmaceutical companies
will deploy a host of abusive and anti-competitive practices in an effort
to protect their market share and maximize their profit.
A study of on-going litigation in U.S. courts and antitrust enforcement actions brought by the FTC, including actions against both branded
and generic drug manufacturers, indicates that generic drug companies
are not paragons of virtue; given adequate incentive, some generic drug
companies will engage in anti-competitive practices that ultimately hurt
consumers. In the U.S., although the existence of antitrust and consumer protection laws and the regulatory force of the FTC has helped to
keep abuses in the pharmaceutical industry to a bare minimum, companies are still finding ingenious ways to evade the law and the watchful
eyes of the FTC. The obvious lesson is that frequently, well-intended
laws are not enough to ensure that medicine is available to those who
need it most.
Despite the laudable goals of the Doha Declaration and the 2003
Decision on Implementation, with respect to the war over access to
medicine in developing countries, there are serious potentials for abuse
in the industry. These abuses could ultimately work to deprive the suffering men and women in the Third World of the intended benefit of the
two texts. In other words, as attention moves away from the emotive
issue of HIV/AIDS and attempts are made to use compulsory licensing
to secure the manufacture of drugs needed to treat other diseases, phar-

409. Countries facing health emergencies can: (i) acquire needed medicine directly from
brand-name pharmaceutical companies; (ii) acquire patented drugs through parallel marketing
channels; (iii) ensure availability of generics through compulsory licensing that enables local
manufacture; (iv) procure generics from another country through the compulsory licensing scheme
established under the 2003 Decision on Implementation; and (v) acquire generic products from
licensees of brand-name companies in situations where the company has voluntarily licensed its
patent.
As explained above, where the prices of pharmaceutical products are lower in a foreign
market, parallel importation permits a government to allow the importation of such products into
the national market so as to offer drugs at more affordable prices. See Submission by the African
Group, supra note 80, para. 25.
For developing countries, in particular, least-developed countries and smaller
economies, "parallel importation" can be a significant way of increasing access to
medications, where the prices charged by patent holders for their products are
unaffordable. Moreover, in situations where the local manufacture of the product is
not feasible, and therefore compulsory licences may be ineffective, parallel
importation may be a relevant tool to ensure access to drugs.
Id. para. 26.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 59:203

maceutical companies may be tempted to employ a host of abusive practices in an effort to safeguard their turf.
I envisage at least six possible types of abuses. First, collusive
agreements between brand-name companies and generic drug companies
may begin to emerge; under these international agreements, generic
companies may agree to refrain from requesting compulsory licenses to
manufacture generic versions of pharmaceutical products in return for
payment or exclusive distribution arrangements. Second, collusive
agreements between generic companies, under which the companies
agree to inflate prices and engage in other monopolistic practices, may
also begin to emerge. Third, abuses in the form of serious attempts by
brand-name pharmaceutical companies to influence the decisions of eligible importing and exporting countries regarding whether and when to
issue a compulsory license may begin to emerge. Fourth, the world may
begin to see abuses in the form of attempts by brand-name companies to
delay or block generic competition altogether by challenging the bioequivalence of generic drugs. Fifth, brand-name companies may attempt
to undermine the 2003 Decision on Implementation by persistently raising questions about whether exporting countries and manufacturers have
satisfied all the requirements stipulated in the Decision, particularly
requirements relating to safeguard and anti-diversion.4 1 ° Sixth, although
a remote possibility, companies may also engage in false marketing
practices aimed at either confusing the general public about the safety of
generic drugs or discouraging doctors from prescribing generic drugs.
Abusive practices of multinational companies can adversely affect
the trading environment in developing countries and burden consumers
with inflated prices for pharmaceutical products. In the United States,
the Sherman Act has been particularly useful in addressing monopolistic
practices in the pharmaceutical sector. If and when pharmaceutical
companies resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade and
adversely impede prompt access to generic drugs, what laws are available to address these practices? Do developing countries and least-developed countries have the requisite legal and institutional capacity to deal
with domestic and transborder anti-competitive practices? Are there
global trade rules that address potential abuses of patents by right holders? Is there a need for a multilateral agreement on competition?
Should such an agreement be developed within the framework of the
410. See, MDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK? ISSUES FOR
5TH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (2003) 3, available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/

THE

documents/Pre-CancunBriefing.pdf. The system may also be abused by governments. Pressure
may be brought on developing countries to forgo their privilege under the Decision. Moreover, in
the context of bilateral and regional trade negotiations, developed countries may push for tighter
patent protection than is envisaged under TRIPS.
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WTO? Will the development of such rules be in the overall interest of
developing countries?
These questions are pertinent because the Doha Declaration and the
2003 Decision on Implementation cannot in and of themselves prevent
the abuse of patent rights by drug companies. These questions will be
briefly addressed in Section VI. As will be seen, many developing
countries currently lack the necessary legislation and/or enforcement
powers to deal with abusive practices of transnational corporations and
are thus among the most vulnerable to the effects of anti-competitive
activities of international cartels. At first glance, therefore, a multilateral rule on competition would appear to be in the interest of developing
countries. A multilateral framework on competition policy could ensure
that developing countries have the capacity and tools to deter and remedy anti-competitive practices. Paradoxically, developing countries
have resisted efforts to negotiate a global competition rule within the
framework of the WTO.
VI. BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE BLUE SEA:
IS A GLOBAL COMPETITION RULE THE ANSWER?
In this section, I examine existing global trade rules that address
anti-competitive behavior in the pharmaceutical sector, evaluate current
efforts towards the development of a global competition rule within the
framework of the WTO, and highlight the special concerns of developing countries regarding these initiatives.
A.

The Treatment of Abusive and Antitrust Practices under the
TRIPS Agreement

Several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement address anti-competitive practices by private actors.'" 1 Article 8(2) stipulates: "Appropriate
measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.14 12 In granting a compulsory license under Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement to remedy an adjudicated violation of competition, a WTO
Member may ignore some of the conditions stipulated in the Agreement
411. See MATrMEWS, supra note 22, at 65 (observing that during negotiations for the TRIPS

Agreement, developing countries pushed for the inclusion of anti-competitive measures).
412. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8(2). See MATrHEWS, supra note 22, at 65 (noting
that Article 8(2) is broad and is designed to address the abuse of contractual licensing
agreements).
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that are intended to safeguard the interests of the patent holder.4 13 Furthermore, in determining the amount of remuneration to be paid in such
cases, "[t]he need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into
account."41' 4
Concerned that patent holders may attempt to impose anti-competitive provisions in contractual licensing agreements, Article 40(2) allows
WTO Members to specify in their legislation "licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant

market."4

5

Members may also "adopt, consistently with the other pro-

visions of [the TRIPS] Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or
control such practices, which may include for example exclusive
grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and
coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member."'4t 6 Article 40 also establishes a "mechanism for
413. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31. Article 31(k) of TRIPS exempts Members from
applying the conditions in subparagraphs Art. 31(b) and Art. 31(f) "where such use is permitted to
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive." Id.
Otherwise, subsections b and f of Article 31 will apply.
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder ... the following provisions shall be
respected:
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency, the fight holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where the
government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the
government, the fight holder shall be informed promptly;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market of the Member authorizing such use.
Id.
414. Id. art. 31(k).
415. Id. art. 40(2).
416. Id. A WTO Member who has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner
that is a national or domiciliary of another WTO Member is undertaking practices in violation of
its laws and regulations, and which wishes to secure compliance with such legislation, may
request for consultations with the Member whose national is in violation. Id. art. 40(3). Article
40(3) stipulates that each Member to whom a request for consultation has been directed, "shall
enter, upon request, into consultations" with the State requesting the consultation.
The Member addressed shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for, consultations with the requesting Member, and
shall cooperate through supply of publicly available non-confidential information of
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extraterritorial investigation and enforcement," and it creates "conditions
for further cooperation through the supply of information."4" 7
The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement give some room for WTO
Members to address patent abuses and anti-competitive practices in the
pharmaceutical sector. One of the primary mechanisms envisaged in the
TRIPS agreement for dealing with anti-competitive practices is compulsory licensing. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not fully deal with
problems that could potentially arise after a compulsory license has been
issued, i.e., practices that operate to delay or suppress the entry of
generic competition even after a compulsory license has been issued.
Furthermore, a measure of legal and institutional sophistication is
required to effectively utilize the existing provisions of the agreement something that many developing countries currently lack.
B.

Is a Global Competition Rule Necessary?

In the last twenty years there has been a growing call for the development of multilateral rules on anti-competitive practices.4" 8 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did not provide binding rules on
restrictive business practices, with the result that efforts to establish
global rules to deal with restrictive business practices have only resulted
in non-binding codes of conduct.4 19 In 1995, the then WTO DirectorGeneral, Renato Ruggiero, observed that there was "an urgent need for a
dispassionate analysis at the multilateral level of the overall links
between competition policy and trade policy, notably to identify the
4 20
problems that may require action and the options for such action.
The EU communication of June 1996 "put competition squarely on the
international agenda."4 2 '
relevance to the matter in question and of other information available to the
Member, subject to domestic law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory
agreements concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting
Member.
Id.

417. MA-rHEWS, supra note 22, at 65 (referring to Articles 40(3) and 40(4)).
418.

BERNARD

HOEKMAN,

COMPETITION POLICY

AND THE

GLOBAL TRADING

SYSTEM:

A

(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1735,
1997) (observing that "[s]tarting in the late 1980s, an increasing number of policymakers and
academics began calling for the development of multilateral disciplines on anticompetitive
DEVELOPING-COUNTRY

PERSPECTIVE

I

practices"), availableat http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade/pdf/wp1735.pdf.

419. Id.
420. Press Release, WTO, Economic globalization increases impact of national competition
policies on International Trade- says Renato Ruggiero (Nov. 20, 1995), at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/pres95_.e/rome I .htm.

421. Karel Van Miert, The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations,
Address Before Ambassadors to the WTO (Apr. 21, 1998), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/

comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_038_en.html.
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Until then, the work in the WTO on competition policy had
"largely taken the form of responses to specific trade policy issues,
rather than a look at the broad picture. 4 2 2 At the first regular biennial
meeting of the WTO at the Ministerial level in 1996 in Singapore,4 23
Trade Ministers reached an agreement to establish a WTO Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
("WGTCP") to look more generally at the relationships between trade
and competition policies. 4 24 Trade ministers also agreed to establish a
working group on trade and investment.4 2 5 The task of the WGTCP was
merely analytical and exploratory. 42 6 The WGTCP was authorized only
"to study" the interaction between trade and competition policy.4127 The
General Council was mandated to keep the work of the WGTCP under
review, and to determine after two years how its work should proceed.
In 2001, the mandate of the WGTCP was extended.4 2 8
Since 1996, efforts of the EU and countries like Japan to move the
agenda towards negotiating a multilateral framework of competition
rules have been largely unsuccessful.4 29 While some members call for a
422. WTO, Competition Policy, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/compelcomp_e.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
423. Trade Ministers met in Singapore from December 9-13, 1996 for a Ministerial Conference
as mandated by Article IV of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. See Press Release, WTO,
World Trade Organization: Ministerial Conference, Singapore, 9-13 December 1996, Singapore
Ministerial Declaration (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter WVTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration], at
http://www.wto.org/englishlnews-e/pres96_e/wtodec.htm.
424. Id. para. 20 ("[W]e also agree to ... establish a working group to study issues raised by
Members relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anticompetitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the
WTO framework."). Since 1997, the WGTCP has reported annually to the General Council. See
WTO, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to
the General Council WT/WGTCP/7 (July 17, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report of the WGTCP],
available at http://docsonline.wto.org. For the Working Group's previous reports on its activities,
see: 1997 (WT/WGTCP/1), 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2), 1999 (WT/WGTCP/3), 2000 (WT/WGTCP/
4), 2001 (WT/WGTCP/5) and 2002 (WT/WGTCP/6), available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
425. WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 423, para. 20.
426. It was agreed that the Working Group will not negotiate new rules or commitments and
that "future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in [the areas of trade and
competition policy], will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO
Members regarding such negotiations." Id.
427. Id.
428. The Doha Declaration mandated that negotiations on a global competition rule could start
after the 2003 Canctin Ministerial Conference "on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit
consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations." See WTO Ministerial Conference,
Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) para. 20
[hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
minist_e/min0l _e/mindeel e.htm.
429. In 1999, Japan called for a global agreement on competition. See Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, Communication From Japan: Preparationsfor the 1999 Ministerial Conference
on Trade and Competition (1999) ("Members should agree to put the item of competition law and
policy on the agenda of the next WTO negotiations with a view to: establishing a competition
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multilateral agreement on competition policy, others strongly oppose the
idea.43 ° Although there appears to be a consensus among WTO Members on the need to address transborder anti-competitive practices, there
is a divergence of opinion on how this problem should be addressed.
Discussions in the WGTCP have revolved around some core topics that
reflect areas where intense study and further discussions are still needed.
In the ensuing section, I discuss three related issues: (i) the pros and
cons of a multilateral agreement on competition; (ii) the structure of any
proposed framework and the need, if any, of such framework to reflect
traditional WTO principles, such as the principles of non-discrimination,
transparency and procedural fairness; and (iii) the elements of progressivity and flexibility that should be included in any multilateral framework on competition policy to be adopted together with questions
relating to technical assistance, capacity building, and special and differential agreement for developing countries.
1.

THE PROS AND CONS OF A MULTILATERAL RULE

Several arguments are frequently advanced to support the call for a
multilateral rule on competition. These include the difficulty of individual countries to effectively address transborder restrictive practices and
the need for a more comprehensive, consistent, and coherent approach to
anti-competitive practices in the global market place instead of the current case-by-case approach to transborder restrictive practices; 4 3 1 the
need to ensure that the gains from liberalization are not undermined by
anti-competitive behavior of private actors; 432 and the belief that "an
international framework of competition rules would contribute to the
regime for each Member; ensuring effective enforcement in order to properly address anticompetitive practices; and promoting international cooperation in this area."), available at http:ll
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wtolmin99/t-compe.html.
430. WTO, TRADE AND COMPETrrION POLICY (noting that "a number of Members have
renewed the call for a WTO framework to support the implementation of effective national
competition policies by Members and enhance the overall contribution of competition policy to
the multilateral trading system while other Members have expressed continuing objections to
negotiations on this matter"), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min99_e/english/
about_e/i 6comp-e.htm.
431. See Van Miert, supra note 421 ("In today's global economy, there are numerous anticompetitive practices which have an international dimension and which therefore come under the
jurisdiction of different competition authorities. This may result in conflicts of law and
jurisdiction and might make it difficult for competition agencies to deal with transborder
restrictive practices.").
432. 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 424, para. 14 ("Experience had shown that
liberalizing trade and encouraging foreign direct investment heightened the dangers posed by anticompetitive practices such as cartels. A multilateral framework would reinforce the application of
competition law and policy at the national level and thereby strengthen Members' ability to
address these challenges.").
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development of international trade"4 3 3 by removing barriers to market
access.4 3 4 It is also argued that the development of a multilateral agree-

ment on competition policy would "act as an impetus towards building a
culture of competition,"4'35 "encourage countries without a competition
policy to adopt one,

43 6

and "ensure that progress made through previ-

ous trade and investment liberalization initiatives at multi-lateral,
regional and bilateral levels, is not negated by private anti-competitive
activities.."4 37 These arguments are aptly summed up in the 2003 report
of the WGTCP:
A multilateral framework on competition policy would establish a

coherent set of principles for sound competition policy among all
Members, without imposing a harmonized approach, and would promote a more transparent and predictable climate to encourage foreign
trade and investment. It would also contribute to the building of
institutional capacity in developing countries, and would assist Members lacking a competition law in drafting an appropriate law and

establishing an enforcement authority. Cooperation in the context of
a multilateral framework offered the prospect of shortening the time
frames that developing countries would need to build and embed
competition laws and policies that would support their development

goals; a key consideration in this regard was the more supportive
environment it would provide for better-targeted assistance and

capacity building. Finally, an agreement would encourage beneficial
cooperation among Members which was important given the increas433. Van Miert, supra note 421.
434. Id. ("There is also a general consensus that competition policy is a key factor in
supporting the competitiveness of industry, in protecting a sound functioning of the economy, and
in maximising consumer welfare.").
Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, addressed the topic of
competition in a speech delivered at Harvard University in 1996:
But if we have succeeded in getting the rules of competition between countries to
work effectively, that very success requires us to go further and consider how the
behaviour of companies can serve to distort international competition. We will need
to see whether there are any areas where explicit competition rules, or specific
understandings, are necessary internationally to complement the statutes that many
governments already have on their books. I have no doubt that competition rules are
essential to the proper functioning of markets - what we need to clarify, however, is
how best to promote such disciplines, both nationally and internationally.
Renato Ruggiero, Director-General, The Global Challenge: Opportunities and Choices in the
Multilateral Trading System, The Fourteenth Paul-Henri Spaak Lecture, Harvard University, (Oct.
16, 1995), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sprr_e/harvar-e.htm.
435. COMPETION BUREAU, Consultations on the Competition Bureau's Paper "Options for the
Internationalization of Competition Policy" - Increased International Cooperation on Competition
Policy (1999), available at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/vwGeneratedlnterE/
ct02112e.html. The Competition Bureau is an agency of the Canadian Government responsible
for maintaining and encouraging fair competition in Canada.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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ing prevalence of cross-border anti-competitive activities.43 8
While acknowledging the need for a global rule on competition,4 3 9
developing countries are reticent about the development of such a framework.4 4 0 There are several reasons for this. First, for many poor coun-

tries, competition policy is not a high priority.4 4 1 Second, developing
countries are afraid that a multilateral framework may not "allow for the
preservation of policy space in regard to developmental objectives. 44 2
Third, developing countries are very worried about the direct financial
cost associated with implementation of such a framework.4 4 3 Fourth,
apart from the financial implications of implementing a global competition rule, developing countries are also concerned about additional difficulties that could arise as a result of "disparities between countries and/
or their firms in respect of levels of development and competitiveness,
experience in the adoption or implementation of competition laws and
the capacity to implement such legislation. ' 44 4 Fifth, some countries are
concerned about the potential scope of any proposed framework in terms
of the types of abusive practices that would be addressed and the place
of "existing WTO principles of transparency, non-discrimination and
procedural fairness and the proposed multilateral framework on competition policy."'" 5 Finally, developing countries also fear that a multilateral agreement on competition would be used as a pretext to open
markets for Northern-based corporations rather than to address the anticompetitive behavior of multinational corporations and their impediments to development. 446
438. 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 424, para. 13.
439. See id. para. 18 ("Most developing countries now acknowledged the need to implement a
national competition law or policy, out of their own self-interest."); see also WTO, Working
Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from Malaysia,
WT/WGTCP/W/239 (July 24, 2003). [hereinafter Communication from Malaysia], available at

http://docsonline.wto.org.
Malaysia acknowledges that a competition policy seeks to ensure efficiency in the
market place. There is growing awareness on the need to develop some kind of
regulatory control on anti-competitive conduct of firms and multinational
companies as the existence of such practices have unnecessarily burdened
consumers with not only inflated prices for goods and services but have also
adversely affected the trading environment. Concerted efforts need to be
undertaken to counter their effects on developing countries.
Id.
440. See 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 424, para. 17.
441. See id.

442. Id.
443. See id.

444. Id.
445. Id.
446. See Martin Khor, WTO competition rules is just Global "welfare" for TNCs (Apr. 23,

1999), at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/welf-cn.htm.
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STRUCTURE OF A POTENTIAL MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK

What would be the structure of a potential multilateral framework
in terms of the breadth and depth of possible obligations that members
will be expected to assume? Will harmonization of national competition
laws be an objective of the framework? What core principles would be
integrated into the framework? Would there be sufficient flexibility
built into the framework taking into account the differences in the situation of WTO Members? These questions are pertinent because paragraph twenty-five of the Doha Declaration - the paragraph that extended
the mandate of the WGTCP - specifically calls attention to them.44 7
Discussions in the Working Group indicate that there is a general
consensus that hardcore cartels must be addressed in any proposed
future rule. Developing countries welcome this focus." 8 Hardcore cartels have been described as "the most unambiguously harmful kind of
competition law violation" 4 9 because they "impose[ ] heavy costs on
the economies of countries, particularly developing countries, that
lack[ ] effective tools to deal with them."'4 50 Although discussions at the
WGTCP suggest that there is a growing consensus that hardcore cartels
should be addressed, there is currently no generally accepted definition
of a hardcore cartel. There is therefore a need for a clearer definition of
hardcore cartels and further discussions on what approach should be
adopted in dealing with them.
The possible inclusion of WTO principles of non-discrimination,
transparency, and procedural fairness into any proposed framework is a
major concern for some developing countries and civil society organizations. For example, Malaysia expressed the concern that transparency
requirements may be used to impose additional burdens on developing
countries. 45 1 Kenya has questioned the wisdom of universalizing principles developed in the context of trade policy. 452 Martin Khor, Director
447. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy will focus on the clarification
of: core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural
fairness, and provisions on hard core cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation;
and support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing
countries through capacity-building.
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 428, para. 25.
448. See Communicationfrom Malaysia, supra note 439, at 2 ("There should be no place for
hardcore cartels in any country, irrespective of its level of economic development. Thus, it would
be more appropriate for the Working Group to concentrate its efforts on discussing anticompetitive practices particularly those related to hardcore cartels.").
449. 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 424, para. 41.
450. Id. (noting also that hardcore cartels raise prices, restrict the supply of essential goods,
and can have the effect of impeding the transfer of technology to developing countries).
45 1. See Communicationfrom Malaysia, supra note 439, at 1.
452. See WTO, Working Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy,
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of Third World Network, argues that increasing advocacy by Northern
governments for application of the principles of "non-discrimination,"
"national treatment," and "transparency" reflect a hidden agenda to give
foreign corporations (whether as suppliers, local investors, or
franchisors) 53equal, if not better, treatment than what is given to local
4
enterprises.

3.

FLEXIBILITIES, PROGRESSIVITY, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, CAPACITY
BUILDING AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

The adoption of a multilateral framework on competition policy
would also undoubtedly involve heavy administrative burdens for many
developing countries, particularly countries that currently lack competition legislation and institutions.45 4 Consequently, "appropriate flexibility and progressivity elements supported by continuing commitments
with regard to technical assistance and capacity building" would be necessary.4 5 5 It is also important that any multilateral framework on competition policy "take cognisance of, and accommodate, a substantial
degree of pluralism in national competition policies, especially among
developing countries, in addition to other, sometimes more interventionist, policies that existed to support development."4'5 6
For many countries, the startup process will be plagued by numerous financial and administrative problems, and some countries will need
technical assistance in establishing an effective regime.4 5 7 It is therefore
important that provisions relating to technical assistance and capacity
building be fully fleshed out.4 58
Communication from Kenya, WT/WGTCP/W/238 (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Communication
from Kenya], available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
The so-called core principles of transparency, non-discrimination and procedural
fairness were developed in the context of trade policy and they were not intended as
universal principles applicable to all issues including competition policy. It is not
self-evident that it is appropriate or desirable to apply these principles to
competition policy.
Id.
453. See Khor, supra note 446.
454. See 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 424, para, 18 (noting that implementing a
global rule on competition could "pose significant difficulties for countries thatlacked a domestic
competition law and/or policy").
455. Id. para. 16.
456. Id. para. 18.
457. See Communicationfrom Malaysia, supra note 439, at 2 ("Capacity constraints abound as
both the government and private sectors are confronted with the prospect of a new business
environment. The international community must continue to focus and prioritise on providing
technical assistance to developing countries.").
458. While there appears to be a general willingness to provide assistance to countries that
need it, developing countries may be forgiven for not taking the promises of assistance seriously.
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Conclusion

Competition laws and policies are necessary both for the overall
well-being of an economy and for the protection of consumers. In general, effective competition law and policy help ensure efficiency in the
marketplace and a robust competitive environment. Arguably, a multilateral rule on competition could be in the interest of developing countries.4 59 A global competition rule could contribute to the development
of institutional capacity in developing countries, assist developing countries currently lacking competition law in drafting appropriate legislation, and encourage beneficial cooperation among WTO Members.
Such a multilateral framework could strengthen the ability of developing
countries to address dangerous anti-competitive practices in the pharma-

ceutical sector and in other sectors.
However, given a myriad of socio-economic problems and developmental objectives, negotiations on competition law-related matters
may not be a priority for many developing countries. In the context of
limited resources and growing obligations under a host of international
trade agreements, the resources of many developing countries may be
better directed at more important socio-economic policies.4 60 In
addressing anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector,
developing countries may be content to simply utilize the tools presently
available under the TRIPS Agreement.46
Fears expressed by developing countries regarding proposed agreements on competition policy have not been overstated, as some proponents of a multilateral agreement claim.4 62 Whether a global
Promises of better-targeted assistance and capacity building in other agreements, including the
TRIPS Agreement, have yet to materialize.
459. See WATAL, supra note 15, at 374 (noting that international cooperation in breaking-up
multinational cartels could be in the interest of developing countries).
460. See Communicationfrom Malaysia, supra note 439, at 2.
At this point of time, we feel that negotiations on competition law-related matters
are not part of the Doha work programme. Domestic competition policy/law may
not be a major consideration for developing countries. National priorities and
limited capacity may require that scarce resources are allocated for the
implementation of more important socio-economic development policies in the
country. Alternative domestic approaches to enhance competition in the form of
regulatory reform are some of the measures being undertaken.
Id.
461. See WATAL, supra note 15, at 374 ("[G]iven the freedom presently available under TRIPS
on competition policy in general and compulsory license in particular, it may not be prudent to
enter the stage of negotiations.").
462. The fears of developing countries, some proponents of a multilateral agreement argue,
could be addressed by the inclusion of transitional periods and flexibility in the rules. According
to Karel Van Miert:
The developing countries may have most to gain from an international framework of
competition rules. On the one hand, they would be able to benefit from the
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competition rule will be in the best interests of developing countries will
depend on the extent to which the interests of developing countries are
fully reflected in any future agreement. It is important that any proposed
multilateral framework does not simply become a smokescreen for promoting market access for transnational corporations and imposing antitrust laws of more developed WTO Members on developing countries.
Therefore, one of the purposes of any future multilateral agreement on
competition should be to address the challenges currently faced by
developing countries by focusing on those anti-competitive practices to
which developing countries are most vulnerable. Firm and effective
commitments regarding capacity building, technical assistance, and special and differential treatment provisions would also be necessary.
Although important, it is not enough that harmonization not be the
goal of any proposed framework.4 63 While there are convincing arguments for why a multilateral framework on competition policy may be in
the interest of developing countries, there is a strong need to take into
account a country's level of development when formulating such an
agreement and establishing obligations regarding its implementation.
Paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration buttresses this fact by stating that
in discussions on the modalities for a potential multilateral framework,
"[flull account shall be taken of the needs of developing and least-developed country participants and appropriate flexibility provided to address
them .""
Overall, should a multilateral framework on competition be negotiated, there would be a need to consider: (i) the different levels of development and economic circumstances of WTO Members; (ii) the
different legal, social, and cultural context of Members; (iii) the difference in availability of resources for implementing the terms of any proposed framework; and (iv) the different levels of institutional
development and the fact that Members have different administrative
systems.4 65 Thus, rather than attempting to impose a one-size-fits-all
standard, as is the case with the TRIPS Agreement, developing a promultilateral framework right away - by enabling requests for co-operation to combat
anti-competitive business practices and by providing for technical assistance
regarding the setting up of domestic competition structures. On the other hand, one
could envisage transitional periods in the multilateral framework designed to meet
certain specific problems of developing economies.
Van Miert, supra note 421.
463. See id. ("It is likely that any agreement in the WTO on competition would not match the
level of competition policy and instruments achieved by countries, which have decades of
experience in antitrust activities. But is this really a problem? We are not talking about replacing
national law by international rules.").
464. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 428, para. 25.
465. See Khor, supra note 446.
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posed set of principles that "would embody common values and promote
cooperative approaches to competition law enforcement"4'6 6 would be a
useful starting point. In the final analysis, it may be important to preserve "the right of a country to choose whether and when to467have a
competition law and the kind of competition policy to adopt.
VII.

CONCLUSION

To a great extent, the war over access to medicine in developing
countries was unnecessary because the TRIPS Agreement appeared to
provide sufficient policy spaces aimed at reducing the potentially
adverse effects of a strong intellectual property regime. The war was
inevitable, however, given the numerous ambiguities that existed in the
TRIPS Agreement, the negotiating history of TRIPS Agreement,4 6 8 and
the understandable efforts by the pharmaceutical industry to safeguard
their profit margins using every means possible. The TRIPS Agreement
was negotiated at a time when the impact of a strong patent protection
was not widely understood in the developing world and at a time when
the debate on the necessity of a global intellectual property regime was
dominated by global corporate actors and countries with intellectual
property expertise.4 69 Today, not only is the relationship between patent
protection and economic growth more understood, new actors "whose
views were peripheral in the Uruguay Round negotiations have now
entered the debate on global intellectual property protection more
wholeheartedly." 47 °
The battles over the precise relationship between patent rights, public health, and state sovereignty reflect the simultaneous convergence of
a number of trends that together define the emerging world of the
466. 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 424, para 16.
467. See Communication from Kenya, supra note 452, at I (also observing that "countries
should preserve the right to adopt a phased approach in terms of discussion, implementation and
enforcement of a competition law" because only then can countries adopt competition regimes
that support their industrial policy).
468. See WATAL, supra note 15, at 382. During the negotiations there was intense pressure on
developing countries to accept stronger obligations relating to the protection of intellectual
property rights. Not surprising, "[f]rom the outset, the TRIPS agreement has been controversial."
Pascal Lamy, International Trade in Drugs: Its Role in Equitable Development, Speech to the
Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Managers (Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Lamy,
International Trade in Drugs], available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/
speeches-articles/splal 62_en.htm.
469. See, e.g., DUNCAN MATrHEWS, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS: WILL THE URUGUAY ROUND CONSENSUS HOLD? 2 (Centre for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 99/02, 2002) (noting that debate was dominated by
countries "with a negotiating advantage over developing countries in terms of intellectual property
expertise"), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2002/
wp9902.pdf.
470. Id. at 2-3.
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twenty-first century. These include the growing convergence of national

economic systems, widening disparities of income and development, the
rise in the power and influence of transnational corporations, and the
explosion of diseases that transcend national boundaries. 4 7 ' In the
twenty-first century, drugs matter because of their role in equitable and
sustainable development and because many developing countries have
little or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.47 In addition, they
have few resources to devote to R&D in essential medicine.4 73 Also, in
the twenty-first century, as a result of globalization, transnational corporations in general and pharmaceutical companies in particular are having
to assume new global responsibility that they did not have before.

Compulsory licensing gives developing countries tools to address
serious health problems by enabling them to obtain generic drugs at an
affordable price.47 4 Although an important instrument in efforts to protect public health, compulsory licenses alone "will not address all the
problems related to public health. ''4 75 This is because there are many
other factors that influence access to medicine in developing countries,
such as the level of research and development, quality of diagnoses,
capacities of health systems and budgets, quality of drugs, and the adequacy of health care professionals.4 76 Given the multiplicity of factors
471. See Lamy, International Trade in Drugs, supra note 468 (of the trends in the twenty-first
century, Lamy points out: "widening disparities of development, global interdependency of trade
movements, acceleration of technological progress which only benefits a minority, the explosion
of a deadly disease known as AIDS, the emergence of global civil society, and the inadequacies of
national and international governance systems").
472. See id. (noting that "little medical and pharmaceutical research is carried out in the
developing world, and that these countries have next to no facilities for the manufacture of
pharmaceutical products").
473. See id.

The gap between North and South is a veritable chasm when it comes to drugs.
According to the WHO, developing countries are home to 76% of the world's
population, but account for only 20% of world drug consumption. Not only that, but
their share has been declining! (In 1976, they represented 24% of world
consumption).
Id.
474. See id.

It is not our aim to encourage the widespread granting of compulsory licences by the
developing countries. But it is clear that in negotiations with the major
pharmaceutical groups, whose revenues often far exceed those countries' GDP, the
fact that the developing countries have the compulsory licence option to fall back on
can give them the leverage they need to secure lower prices. In this way,
compulsory licensing can operate as an effective form of deterrence.
Id.
475. Submission by the African Group, supra note 80, para. 28.

476. See Lamy, International Trade in Drugs, supra note 468. Lamy notes a host of factors
that account for the gap between the North and South when it comes to drugs. These include:
the near total lack of social security and health insurance systems in the South,
inadequate and badly-organised infrastructure, poor hygiene, badly educated and
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that influence access to medicine, a combination of policies is needed to
ensure that drug prices are lowered on a sustainable basis.4 7
Some battles may be over, but the war against diseases in developing countries continues. For one thing, it is not clear yet whether developing countries will actually maximize the political space now afforded
by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation.
Furthermore, experts rightly note that "[e]ven with newly discounted
price for patented anti-retroviral drugs and even with dramatically
cheaper equivalents from generic producers, developing countries and
their private citizens will find it impossible to buy significant quantities
of life-saving AIDS medicines without significant and sustained support
from the international community."4'7 8 Unfortunately, multilateral funding for AIDS treatment has been very poor. Although the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the "Global Fund") was created in 2001 to finance aggressive intervention against AIDS and other
479
disease killers, the Global Fund suffers from serious under-funding.
Most importantly, given the possibilities of abuse in the pharmaceutical
industry, the future will depend on the type of rules that exist to address
abusive and anti-competitive practices by drug companies, the extent of
self-regulation that exists in the industry, the role of ethical codes of
conduct in the industry, and the extent to which external pressures can
be brought to bear upon the pharmaceutical industry. In this respect,
actors such as civil society groups have a pivotal role to play in addressing the growing global influence of the transnational pharmaceutical
industry, raising awareness about abuses in the industry, and providing
trained staff, and the failure to implement certain disease-prevention measures. The
underlying problem is thus the same as for other forms of under-development: a
crying deficiency of governance and public policy.
Id.
477. See Mrdecins Sans Fronti~res, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, What is the
Campaign? (suggesting a host of strategies, including "encouraging generic competition,
voluntary discounts on branded drugs, global procurement, and local production") [hereinafter
What is the Campaign?], at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/campaign.htm.
478. BROOK K. BAKER, HEALTH GAP, THE GLOBAL FUND TO TREAT AIDS, TB, AND
MALARIA: FULFILING [sic] OR BETRAYING THE PROMISE OF TREATMENT 1, (2002) (noting that
during most of the 1990's, "the actual per person expenditure on all AIDS prevention and
treatment programs in Africa dropped to as little as $3 per person per year"), at http://www.
aidspan.org/gfo/docs/gfo29a.pdf.
479. See id. at 2. ("lOin April 28, 2001, Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the United Nations,
called for the establishment of a Global Funds to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. ...
Annan estimated that an initial response to AIDS . . . would cost between $7 and $10 billion
dollars per year."). Although, to date, donors have pledged over $6.1 billion to support programs
around the world through 2008, the Global Fund is currently facing a $0.7 billion shortfall of
resources for its 2005 commitments. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis,
Funding Gap 2005, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/funds-raised/funding-gap. See
generally The Global Fund, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/.
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countries with timely information that will be needed to address abuses
if and when they arise.
Just as a score of factors influence access to effective medicine,
"many actors have a role to play in addressing the access crisis. '"480
Both local and national governments clearly "have the responsibility to
give priority to public health through strong, pro-health legislation. '"481
Attention must now turn to other issues affecting access, such as inadequacies in the health infrastructure of many developing countries.4 82
Unless these issues are addressed, many in the developing world will
remain without access to essential drugs even if the drugs are offered at
extremely low cost or for free.4 83
International organizations such as the World Health Organization,
World Bank, and UNAIDS must "adopt and advocate for policies that
give the highest level of protection for public health. 4 84 Along with
continuing efforts to reduce the cost of medicine through generic competition, protecting public health also requires concurrent research and
advocacy on additional barriers to access,48 5 as well as a renewed commitment to supporting the United Nations Global Funds to Fight AIDS,
Malaria, and Tuberculosis.
The private sector remains very important. Pharmaceutical companies can contribute to long-term solutions by "cutting their prices for
developing countries in a transparent and predictable way. 4 86 For
example, differential pricing remains a viable option.4 87 In addition,
international donors and foundations remain very important beyond
funding disease prevention; they can also fund drug purchase and other
treatment programs. 48 8 Finally, civil society groups have a continuing
480. What is the Campaign?, supra note 477.
481. Id.
482. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIDS SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2002) (observing that "[tlhe public profile of
the global drug pricing issue has been raised but less attention has been paid to other issues
affecting access to treatment") [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES], available at http://www.
unaids.org/wac/2002/icasoHumanRights.pdf.
483. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIDS SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, ADDING
INFRASTRUCTURE TO THE ADVOCACY AGENDA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii (2003) (observing that
there are examples of countries where drugs have been offered at extremely low prices but access
to treatment has not increased for people living with HIV) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY],
available at http://www.icaso.org/InfrastructureRep.-ENGrev.pdf..
484. Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, Frequently
Asked Questions para. 4, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/faq.shtm (last visited Jan.
28, 2005).
485. See id. para. 9.
486. Id. para. 4.
487. Differential pricing allows the pharmaceutical industry to provide drugs to the poorest
countries at significantly reduced prices.
488. Id.
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responsibility to monitor and hold accountable all the important players
- states, international donors, and pharmaceutical companies - and to

expose abuses and other failures when they occur.
It is also important that the integrity of the patent system is pre-

served through good faith use of the Doha Declaration and the 2003
Decision on Implementation. The patent system is needed to finance
new research and development and ensure that drug manufacturers continue to bring newer and better drugs to the market.48 9
The "access to treatment" debate unearthed many hidden factors
that impede access to essential drugs for millions in the developing
world.4 90 In addition to increasing access to essential drugs in developing countries, the debate brought the human right to health back into the
spotlight.4 9' The "access to treatment" debate has also raised interesting
questions about how to balance ethical concerns with economic concerns.4 92 Public health is an ethical and human rights issue, but does it
necessarily trump substantial economic and other public interests when
patent rights are implicated?4 93 What constraints should society impose
on the rights of a patent holder? Can the pharmaceutical industry be
489. However, studies in the U.S. and elsewhere show that the industry's emphasis on R&D is
somewhat exaggerated. Data gathered by Families USA shows that, in the U.S. at least, major
pharmaceutical companies "spend significantly more on marketing, advertising, and
administration than they spend on R&D." FAMILIES USA, PROFITING FROM PAIN: WHERE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG DOLLARS Go 1 (2002), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/
DocServer/PPreport.pdf?docID=249. In its study of nine U.S. pharmaceutical companies that
manufacture or market the fifty top-selling drugs for seniors, Families USA found that "[o]n
average, the nine companies spent 11 percent of revenue on R&D and 27 percent of revenue on
marketing, advertising, and administration." Id. at 5. "No company spent as much as 20 percent
of revenue on R&D, whereas every company except Merck spent more than 20 percent of revenue
on marketing, advertising, and administration." Id. Finally, the report found that the
pharmaceutical industry was very generous to its top executives, with the result that "[t]he 10
highest-paid executives across the nine companies received a total of $236 million in
compensation in 2001, exclusive ofunexercised stock options." Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
490. In the case of HIV/AIDS, barriers to accessing treatment take many forms, including "the
cost of drugs, political denial and disinterest, stigma and discrimination, and inadequate health
systems." EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 483, at p. iii. For a discussion on the role of
infrastructure and HIV/AIDS treatment, see generally INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIDS SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONS, ADDING INFRASTRUCLrURE TO THE ADVOCACY AGENDA (2002), availableat http:/
/www.icaso.org/docs/Adding%20Infrastructure.pdf.
491. INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 482, at 8 (arguing that "[a]ccess to medical
treatment of HIV infection is crucial for the respect of the right to health and the right to life").
Essentially some local and global NGOs, drawing on some human rights treaties, argued that
access to treatment was a human right issue. The efforts of this organization led to the adoption of
the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS by the Second International Consultation on HIV/
AIDS and Human Rights, held in Geneva, Switzerland in September 1996. See id. at I.
492. See Lamy, International Trade in Drugs, supra note 468 (observing that although public
health is an ethical issue, there are other economic interests at stake).
493. See id. ("There is nothing to be gained by constructing a false opposition between
intellectual property, which is essential if we are to have the innovation we need to produce new
drugs, and access to care; instead, we should seek ways to make them work together.").
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trusted to develop sound ethical principles to guide the activities of its
members? These are important questions that we must continue to
address as the global pharmaceutical industry evolves.

